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
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The Cover: The Four Accomplishments

by William Pinckard

*"All things of this world I can generally understand,
only I cannot bear myself to be defiled by playing go."*

— Lun Pu

Lun Pu (967–1028), who wrote those words, was famous as a poet, was skilled at playing the lute and calligraphy, but poor at go and evidently ashamed of it. What he was probably referring to are the 'Four Accomplishments', four arts especially esteemed in China from around the 7th or 8th century, mastery of which was considered to be the mark of a well-rounded gentleman-scholar.

As a set these four — the lute, the game of go, calligraphy and painting — became known in Japan under the name *kinki shoga*, with the lute often represented by the *koto*, *biwa* or *samisen*. In a set of rules for the behavior of Japanese monks and nuns dating from the year 701 we find that playing the *koto* (lute) and playing go were not restricted. This may reflect the high position that these two arts had achieved even at such an early date.

Sets such as this one and many others like 'The Four Seasons', 'The Five Elements', 'The Eight Views of Lake Biwa', 'The Fifty-Three Stations of the Tokaido', and so on, exemplify a principle of organization much favored by artists in Japan to generate new pictorial ideas within a familiar and accepted framework. In the medium of the woodblock print each design in such a set was intended to be capable of standing alone as an independent picture yet also to be capable of yielding a deeper meaning in relation to other prints in the same set and to other sets on the same theme produced by other artists in different years — a brilliant conception by which it was

possible to set up a nexus linking the four directions with the past and the future.

Woodblock prints of the *ukiyo-e* school draw upon a deep pool of associations and allusions to which literature, legend, philosophy and history have each contributed. To the public for which they were made this gave them a richness and emotional resonance that went far beyond their purely graphic qualities. This, rather than novelty, was what artists usually strove for, and in this ancient habit is probably to be found one answer to the question of why we see such a striking identity of ideas among graphic artists from generation to generation.

Since it was assumed that everyone knew what the 'Four Accomplishments' involved, an artist could present the theme in ingenious disguises. Children or women might take the place of scholars, and sometimes the various instruments of the four arts were not shown but only suggested by means of visual puns.

This month's cover shows the left and center panels of an *oban* woodblock triptych by Chikashige published in 1881. Titled *Kinki Shoga no Zu*, this print depicts the courtesans of a high-class establishment showing off their skills at music, poetry, painting and go (two are even playing shogi in the right-hand panel, which is not shown here). The print was probably commissioned by the owner of the establishment, with the intention of giving copies as souvenirs to his patrons.

(From the Ishi Press Collection)

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Go World News

International News

Kobayashi Wins Japan-China Meijin Playoff

Kobayashi has triumphed yet again in the annual playoff between the Japanese and Chinese Meijins. In the 4th annual playoff, played in Tokyo, he extended his record to eight wins in a row by defeating Ma Xiaochun 2-0. In his third attempt, Ma was once again unable to pick up his desperately coveted first win.

Kobayashi has a strong sense of responsibility to Japanese fans. He has said that he doesn't feel he has earned the Meijin title until he wins the Japan-China playoff. The only consolation for Ma is that in the second game he came his closest yet to winning. After taking an early lead, Kobayashi's habitual over-optimism led him to slacken off and give Ma a chance to get back into the game. After realizing the danger, however, Kobayashi tightened the screws and fended off his opponent.

The results:

Game 1 (10 Dec.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (12 Dec.). Kobayashi (W) won by 1 1/2 points.

The SBS Cup: The World's Strongest Player

Korea Starts Well in New International Tournament

Yeo Chang-hyeok 5-dan of Korea made an excellent start in a new international tournament, the SBS Cup: The World's Strongest Player. This is a new *haya-go* or lightning tournament played among five-man teams from Japan, China and Korea and sponsored by SBS, a Seoul television station. It is run on a rotating knockout system, in which a player is matched alternately against players from the other two countries until he is defeated. The time allowance is ten minutes per player, followed by 40 seconds per move, with players being allowed to exceed the 40 seconds twice. The teams have to announce their starting order the day before the match begins. The composition of the teams is as follows:

Japan: Takemiya Judan, Rin Kaiho Tengen, Kato Masao 9-dan, Yoda 8-dan, and Komatsu 7-dan.

China: Nie Weiping 9-dan, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan, Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan, Yu Bin 9-dan, and Cao Dayuan 9-dan.

Korea: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan, Suh Bongsoo 9-dan, Suh 9-dan, Lee Changho 5-dan, and Yeo Chang-hyeok 5-dan.

The first four rounds were played in Seoul on 25 and 26 November 1991. Yeo 5-dan made a brilliant start by defeating Komatsu of Japan, Cao of China, and Yoda of Japan. Yu Bin of China finally put a stop to his winning run with a half-point victory.

The second four rounds started on 29 November. Japan's position didn't improve, with Takemiya losing to Yu Bin, who then lost to Suh Nung-ook 9-dan of Korea. Kato, who had hurriedly flown to Seoul on hearing of the bad start made by his team, temporarily stopped the rout by defeating Suh, but then he lost to Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan of China, so Japan is down to its last player, Rin.

The unique feature of this tournament is that there is no second prize. The winning team will receive 100 million won (about \$150,000) and the others nothing. The match is being staged to celebrate the launching of a new television channel, SBS, in December.



Kobayashi Satoru

Kobayashi Satoru Puts Japan Ahead in 6th Super Go Series

After a valiant effort by Kobayashi Satoru, Japan is poised to win the 6th Japan-China

Super Go series, but it still has to dispose of China's famed 'iron goalkeeper' Nie Weiping.

Japan had taken the lead for the first time in the current series when Awaji Shuzo 9-dan defeated Chen Xinlin 8-dan in Dalian in China on 30 October 1991, but the score was promptly evened again on 2 November when Yu Bin beat Awaji. That gave Kobayashi Satoru, who starred in the 2nd series with five wins in a row, another chance to be a hero. He rose to the occasion, defeating Yu Bin on 18 December 1991 and Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan on 10 December (both games were played at the Nihon Ki-in).

Japan now has a 7-5 lead and a good chance of scoring its second victory in the six series to date. China is down to its last player, while Japan still has Hane and Kato to come. However, in view of Nie's record in this tournament of ten wins to one loss, Japan will not taking anything for granted.



Lee Changho of Korea wins the first of what will probably be many international tournaments. Lee has a perfect poker face, but he is reported to have smiled during the review of the third game of the Tongyang final.

Lee Wins 3rd Tongyang Securities Cup

Sixteen-year-old Lee Changho of Korea has done it: won his first international title. Moreover, he did it by pulling off an upset victory over that veteran of international go, Rin Kaiho.

Lee, already the holder of six titles in his homeland, is probably the toast of Korea after defeating Rin 3-2. When the match resumed,

with the score 1-all, Rin Kaiho took the lead by winning the third game, but Lee fought back courageously in the fourth and fifth games. In both of these, Rin Kaiho built up a good position, but he was unable to hold out against the tenacity and never-say-die spirit of his young opponent. Rin commented later that he could think of very few players apart from Kobayashi Koichi who could match Lee's endgame skill.

A couple of years ago, Lee stated that his ambition was to be the world's number one player by the age of 20. He has already taken a big step towards achieving this goal — way ahead of schedule.

The results:

Game 3 (23 Jan. 1992). Rin (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (25 Jan.). Lee (B) won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 5 (27 Jan.). Lee (W) won by 1 1/2 points.



Yamashiro: halfway to becoming Kisei

News from Japan

Yamashiro Stuns Kobayashi by Winning First Two Games in Kisei Title

Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan has upset all predictions by winning the first two games in the 16th Kisei title match. When Yamashiro became the challenger, most people thought that Kobayashi was assured of setting the record of seven successive Kisei title wins that has been his goal, but the champion was in for a nasty surprise when the title match started. In the first game, played in Sydney on 16, 17 January 1992, Yamashiro scored an easy win when

Kobayashi let himself be burdened with four weak groups. Kobayashi played better in the second game and seemed to be set to even the series, but Yamashiro fought on with great tenacity and upset his lead. This is the worst start Kobayashi had made to a Kisei title match, and fans are wondering if we are going to see a new grand champion.

The tenacity that Yamashiro displayed in the second game is what earned him the right to challenge. In the best-of-three playoff with Cho Chikun, he lost the first game and was doing badly in the second when Cho started making errors in time trouble. That gave Yamashiro the chance to snatch a half-point win. Perhaps Cho was disheartened by this, for he let Yamashiro upset him again in the third game. This is the third time in six years that Cho has lost the playoff to decide the Kisei challenger.

The results:

Game 1 (played in Sydney on 16, 17 January 1992). Yamashiro (B) won by resignation.

Game 2 (29, 30 January). Yamashiro (W) won by 4 1/2 points.

Playoff to decide the challenger:

Game 1 (14 Nov.). Cho (W) won by 5 1/2 points.

Game 2 (28 Nov.). Yamashiro (W) won by 1/2 point.

Game 3 (5 Dec.). Yamashiro (B) won by 3 1/2 points.

Late news. The third game, played on 5, 6 February, was won by Kobayashi.



Three stones on the tengen (centre point) for Rin. He has now defeated Cho, Kobayashi Koichi, and Kato in this title.

Rin Defends 17th Tengen Title

Rin Kaiho ended the year on an upswing,

clinching his third successive Tengen title by fending off Kato Masao 3-1. This was a good ending to a mixed year for Rin: he defeated Nie 2-1 in the Japan-China Tengen playoff, but then lost 1-4 in the Meijin title match after posting the second-ever perfect record in the Meijin league.

Rin started the Tengen title match well, winning the first two games, but then Kato bounced back with a win in a very unusual game in which most of the fighting focussed on the second line. In the fourth game, the lead switched back and forth a couple of times, but in the end Rin scored an upset by the narrowest margin.

The results:

Game 1 (31 Oct.). Rin (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (22 Nov.). Rin (W) won by 1 1/2 points.

Game 3 (2 Dec.). Kato (W) won by resig.

Game 4 (19 Dec.). Rin (B) won by 1/2 point.

Nakazawa Defends Women's Honinbo Title

Nakazawa Ayako 2-dan has defended the 10th Women's Honinbo title, defeating the challenger, Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan, 2-1. Nakazawa set a record in 1990, when she became the first teenager to win a women's title in Japan. Now a mature 20, she held off the challenge of Kobayashi Chizu, who was making her first title challenge for 11 years. Once again Nakazawa played with her characteristic boldness in the fuseki, going for centre thickness and emphasizing attack.

The results:

Game 1 (played in Hawaii on 31 Oct.). Nakazawa (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (22 Nov.). Kobayashi (W) won by 14 1/2 points.

Game 3 (2 Dec.). Nakazawa (B) won by 2 1/2 points.

Aoki Challenges for Women's Meijin Title

Aoki Kikuyo 4-dan won the right to challenge Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan for the 4th Women's Meijin title by defeating Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan in the playoff, held on 27 November. This is a return match: Aoki lost the title to Sugiuchi last year. The first game was played on 22 January 1992 and was won by Sugiuchi.

47th Honinbo League (as of 31 January 1992) Title-holder: Cho Chikun

Rank	Player	KK	R	KS	O	KM	I	KH	C	Score
1	Kobayashi K.	—	1		0		1	1		3 — 1
2	Rin Kaiho	0	—		0			1	0	1 — 3
3	Kataoka S.			—		0	1	0	1	2 — 2
4	Otake	1	1		—	0		1		3 — 1
5	Kato Masao			1	1	—	1		0	3 — 1
5	Imamura	0		0		0	—		0	0 — 4
5	Komatsu H.	0	0	1	0			—		1 — 3
5	Chan Ka Yui		1	0		1	1		—	3 — 1

Note: Players are ranked according to results in the previous league.

Aoki had an excellent year last year. Her results of 36 wins to 10 losses are the best within memory for a woman player at the Nihon Ki-in and put her in second place among players 6-dan and under.

Chan Shares Lead in Honinbo League

Chan Ka Yui 7-dan is doing extraordinarily well in his debut in the Honinbo league. In the first round he defeated Kato and in the fourth round he beat Rin Kaiho, to give him a share of first place with Kobayashi Koichi, Otake, and Kato.

Chan is a former amateur player who took 3rd place in the 1st World Amateur Go Championship back in 1979, then 2nd place in 1980 (in those days we spelt his name Ch'en Chai-jui); after that he moved to Hong Kong, as whose representative he won the 8th WAGC in 1986. He then decided to pursue a professional career and joined the Kansai Ki-in as a 5-dan in 1987. His career has suddenly blossomed and he has to be given a chance to be-

come the Honinbo challenger.

Shuko Beats Cho in Meijin League

Fujisawa Shuko made an excellent start with a good win over Cho Chikun in the first round of the 17th Meijin league. Unfortunately, he lost in the second round, but his performance against Cho demonstrated that he is still a significant force — not that he needed to prove anything after winning the Oza title.

Judan Challenger: Miyazawa or Kobayashi

We may see a new face in the Judan title match this year. Miyazawa Goro 8-dan has won the winners' section of the 30th Judan title, and if he can beat the winner of the losers' section, Kobayashi Koichi, he will challenge Takemiya Judan. Miyazawa (born in 1949) won the 10th Shinjin-O title in 1985, but he has yet to challenge for an open title. A clash between him and Takemiya would be interesting, for he has perhaps the most aggressive style at the Nihon Ki-in.

17th Meijin League (as of 31 January 1992) Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	R	T	C	Y	F	O	I	A	K	Score
1	Rin Kaiho	—	0								0 — 1
2	Takemiya	1	—		1						2 — 0
3	Cho Chikun			—		0					0 — 1
4	Yoda		0		—						0 — 1
5	Fujisawa S.			1		—		0			1 — 1
6	Otake						—		1		1 — 0
7	Iwata T.					1		—		0	1 — 1
7	Awaji						0		—	1	1 — 1
7	Komatsu H.							1	0	—	1 — 1

Note: Players are ranked according to results in the previous league.

Players who lose a game in the winners' section are shunted to the semi-parallel loser's section, so they get a second chance. The only player who doesn't is the winner of the winners' section. Just for the record, in the past ten years, the winner of the winners' section has become the challenger only five times.

News from China

Ma Starts Well in Qiwang Title

Ma's challenge to Nie Weiping for the 3rd Qiwang (king of go) title has started well. Playing white, Ma won the first game, held on 5 January. Ma played badly in the second game, held on 7 January, and was within a couple of moves of resigning when Nie started making mistakes, letting Ma stage an upset. One more win will give Ma the title.

In the playoff to decide the challenger, Ma defeated Liu Xiaoguang 2-1.

1991 Title Winners

4th Mingren (= Meijin): Ma defeated Nie 3-2.

5th Tianyuan (= Tengen): Nie d. Liu 3-0.

2nd Qiwang: Nie d. Qian Yuping.

5th Ten Strongest Players: Nie 1st, Ma 2nd.

All-China Individual Ch'ship: Ma 1st, Yu

Bin 2nd, Yuan 3rd.

13th New Physical Education Cup: Nie v. Chen Xinlin (result not in yet).

5th CCTV Cup: Ma defeated Cao Dayuan in final.

News from Korea

The Age of Lee Changho

The age of Lee Chang-ho has dawned earlier than expected in Korea. As of December, Lee held six titles as opposed to Cho Hun-hyun's five. (Suh Bong-seo held two and Yeo one.) For Cho, that is quite a falling away from the nine titles he held in 1988 and 1989, and for Lee it is a step-up from the three he held in 1990.

Cho has a chance of catching up, however. In the top title, the 3rd Saint of Go (the same name as the Japanese Kisei title), he is challenging Yeo Chang-hyeok 5-dan and after two games the score is 1-all. Cho won the 1st title, but then lost it to Yeo, then 4-dan, last year. Earlier, Cho completed a successful defence of his King of Go title, defeating Suh Bong-seo 3-0 in the 16th title match.

Korean go looks like revolving around this formidable teacher-pupil pair for the foreseeable future.

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The focus of the workshop will be on improving your strategic decisions and broadening your whole board vision. Improving your tactics and local fighting will also be taught. — James Kerwin

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The 4th Fujitsu Cup Semifinals



O Rissei and Cho Chikun review the semifinal game that, as it turned out, decided the 1991 Fujitsu World Championship.

To complete our coverage of the 4th Fujitsu Cup, we would like to present commentaries on the semifinals. The first, a review of the Cho–O Rissei game by the losing side, shows just why Cho is such a fearsome opponent. The commentary is a little technical in places, but we hope it gives some insight into play at the highest professional levels.

Cho Chikun v. O Rissei

White: O Rissei 9-dan (Japan)

Black: Cho Chikun, Honinbo (Japan)

Played in Osaka on 6 July 1991.

Commentary by O Rissei. Text by Konishi Taizo 6-dan.

In effect, this game decided the tournament, since the winner of the other semifinal, Qian Yuping, fell ill and didn't turn up to contest the final.

As we have mentioned before, O Rissei has gained a reputation in the last couple of years for his originality in the fuseki. In this game he

springs an innovation on Cho, but unfortunately gets the timing wrong, giving Cho the chance to bounce back with a brilliant counter.





Figure 1 (1–27)


Figure 1 (1-27). Timing makes the difference.

Playing 14 after exchanging 12 for 13 is a special strategy on O's part. O: 'Instead of 16, I also considered 1 to 9 in *Dia. 1*, but will White really answer at 6?'

The moves from 16 to 20 form a very interesting strategy. This is probably the first time it has been tried out. We would like to look at the new pattern and Cho's clever move in detail.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

18: at 12; 19: at 14



Dia. 3

6: retakes



Dia. 4


O: 'Instead of 22, I should simply have pushed along at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Answering at Black 2 would be an overplay: White goes into action with 3 on.' The 'stone tower' squeeze with 10 and 12 is a standard tesuji; the continuation is forced. Black wins the capturing race when he connects at 1 in *Dia. 3*, but after White retakes with 6 he gets a stylish result. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3* at 2, White 'a' is troublesome.

O: 'Consequently, White 1 and Black 2 in *Dia. 4* can be expected. The hane at 3 will then be a very effective way of settling the white group here.'


The reason why White played 22 before 24 is that he expected the result in *Dia. 5*. He was

well aware that the result in *Dia. 4* was good enough, but he would have been even happier to see *Dia. 5*. His stone at 1 retains its vitality. Pros are covetous of profit.

O: 'Black 25 was a brilliant move. If White extends at 2 in *Dia. 6*, Black will go all-out with 3. Even if White plays 4 etc. now, Black 1 gets in his way, so he doesn't get the effective squeeze he does in *Dia. 3*. This would be hopeless for White.'



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

O commented that he was very tempted to play 26 at 27, but the loss from Black A would have been too great.

With 27, White's promising innovation (16 to 20) has ended in failure. O candidly admitted that 'the brilliancy of 25 really shook me.'



O Rissei

Born in Taiwan on 7 November 1958. Came to Japan in 1971, became a disciple of Kano 9-dan. Shodan in 1972, 9-dan in 1988. Has won four Kisei dan championships, the 6th Shinjin-O (1981), the 14th New Stars (1983), and the 11th Kakusei Cup (1989). Played in the 42nd Honinbo league (1986).





Figure 2 (28-54)

Figure 2 (28-54). An uncharacteristic move by Cho


After meeting with Cho's brilliancy, the onus is on O to play patiently and wait for a chance to get back into the game. He switches to 28.

Settling the shape with 29 to 33 is reasonable, as is the continuation to 43 on the right. O: 'This is about the best I can do. If White uses 36 to escape at 42, he'll just get a heavy group after Black A. That would be hopeless.' Even so, Black gets a lot of secure territory.

O: 'The sociable response to 46 of Black 47 is a slack move, quite unlike Cho Honinbo. Black 1 in *Dia. 7* would take major profit; after 2, Black dodges to 3 and has a clear lead.'



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

When White switches to 54, the *aji* of White B is revived. The game is now delicately poised.




Figure 3 (54-100)

71: throw in (at 65); 72: captures (at 67)

Figure 4 (54-100). Shrewdly seizing profit

When White gets a stone in place at 54, the sequence from 58 becomes his privilege. Black wins the capturing race with the 'stone tower' squeeze, but White gains from squeezing on the outside. If Black had played 54, this would all have been his territory without having to add any stones. The difference is large.

O: 'The throw-in of 74 looked forward to using 80 to create forcing moves from the outside, but it was an overplay. Black promptly seized the opportunity to force with 75 and 77; I lost the equivalent of the komi. That made me upset again. White should have been able to squeeze in sente here, with 84 and White 75, etc., so it would have been better to do nothing, keeping open both the threats of White 80 and the squeeze.'

White now has no choice but to pin his hopes on his centre *moyo* with 88 and 90. Attaching immediately at 91 shows clever timing. Black leaves the big move of A for later, then again sets out to make White overconcentrated with 97.

O: 'If I pull back at 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of 98, having Black push up at 4 is unpleasant. If White 'a', Black cuts at 'b', creating all sorts of forcing moves. White 98 and 100 leave bad *aji* at B, but I thought that I had no choice but to go all-out like this.'





Figure 4 (101-161)

ko: 26, 29, 32, 35, 38; 39: connects (at 2);
ko: 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56



Dia. 9

Figure 4 (101-161). The losing move

White copes with the cut of 1 with the squeeze-connection tesuji of 2 to 6. White 8 and 10 are better left unplayed: they lose ko threats.

O: 'The sequence from 12 to 17 is reasonable (if Black 15 at 16, a trade follows with White 15, Black A, White B), and White 18 is the only move. The diagonal connection of 1 in Dia. 9 would be more solid, but White loses when Black forces with 2.' Later, the moves from Black 'a' follow (Black 'e' is a connection), leaving Black with the clever move of 'k' with which to link up.

O: 'White 20 is the losing move. It's funny I didn't connect at 23.' If White 20 at 23, White

can fight back against Black A with White C.

Although White eventually wins the ko, the result is little different from making a hane at 60 from White 20. During the course of the ko fight, Black makes the very effective moves of 49 and 51, deciding the game. The centre is cut to pieces when he moves out with 57.





Figure 5 (162-227)



Dia. 10

Figure 5 (162-227). White's last chance

The clever cut of 65 enables Black to save this clump of stones with 67 and 69. Black is now way ahead.

O: 'If Black had answered the peep of 80 by connecting at 90, nothing could happen and Black would have had a big win. Before I tried to capture him with 102, I should have played the forcing move of 1 in Dia. 10. If Black plays 'a', then thanks to this exchange White gets good *aji* with 'b'. In reality, the result should be bad for White, as Black has the brilliancy of 8, setting up a ko with 10, but still this was a missed opportunity for White.'

When Black simply pushes out at 107,

White cuts at 108 and gets a *seki*. However, cutting across the knight's move with 113 works: the bottom white group collapses. That's why White needed 1 in Dia. 10.

O: 'However, if I had played 1 in Dia. 10, Cho, being Cho, would probably have discovered the brilliancy of 8 even in *byo-yomi* of a minute a move.'

Reaching the semifinal was O's best performance yet in the Fujitsu Cup, but it was still a tournament full of regrets for him. He has shown in recent years that he is a very talented player. Surely his day will come.

White resigns after Black 227.

(Kido, October 1991)

Kobayashi v. Qian

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Black: Qian Yuping 9-dan

Played in Osaka on 6 July 1991.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

This game represents a considerable achievement for Qian: he is the first Chinese player besides Nie to defeat Kobayashi. The latter's record against Chinese players to date had been 24-2, and he had won all the 14

games he had played in China. The two losses had come at the hands of Nie. Qian's victory in this game probably broke down an important psychological barrier for Chinese players.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Dubious play at the bottom

Exchanging 11 for 12 before attaching at 13 is a variation of the usual joseki. After the continuation to 22, the 11-12 exchange becomes a gain for Black.



Qian (left) scores a morale-boosting win for Chinese players.

After the game, Kobayashi queried his moves at 28 and 30. Ishida: 'If there is a problem in the play here, I think that it's in 24. The aim of this extension is to make use of the stone at 12 — pointing out to Black that his group is not settled yet — but it is a little heavy. White could develop more rapidly with 24 at 32 — if Black 25, he jumps to A.'

When Black attacks at 27, he is able to solidify his bottom right group in the continuation to 38 while White's group is still not settled.

When White makes the pincer of 40, Black goes for centre influence with 41 on. The aim of 49 next is to stop White from getting too much territory on the side: Black B instead would give White C.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). A definite lead for Black

White 52 (ten minutes) was the first move that Kobayashi spent any real time on. The quickness of his play was perhaps a sign of his fatigue: he had finished the fifth game of the Honinbo title match in Hokkaido on the 4th, then flown to Osaka on the 5th. He commented later that he would have liked even just one day's rest between the games. His record for July was a dismal 2-5.

If White simply ataris at 54 instead of 52, Black 55, White 56, Black 57 follow. The difference in the game is that White gets stones in place at 58 and 60. They offer, admittedly from a distance, some support to White's centre bottom group.

Black 63 is solid. If Black were behind, he would go as far as A. Qian was obviously satisfied with the territorial balance.

Black 65 was the last move before the lunch break. The neighbouring Cho-O game had only progressed 27 moves.

Black 69 was another sign Qian believed he was ahead. It takes profit but also helps White to strengthen his group. Ishida agreed that Black was a little ahead.

White 76. White would like to expand the top with 78, but his bottom group would come under attack, so he might not gain anything.

When Black plunges in at 91, White no longer has any chance in a territorial contest. Hence his violent attack at 92.

Ishida: 'The usual move is 92 at B, but linking up with the ordinary move of C will put Black ten points ahead on the board.' (Ishida gave the continuation White 96, Black 97, White D.)




Figure 3 (101-140)

Figure 3 (101-140). Unable to attack

Kobayashi is handicapped by his weak groups. He can't hope to kill the centre black group, so he contents himself with cutting off a stone with 6 to 10. However, Black 13 is big: applying pressure to White's side group helps Black to settle his centre group.

Figure 4 (141-183) (next page)

White 56. Note that White can't cut at A: Black B.

When White resigns, he is 12 or 13 points

behind on the board, according to Ishida. This may not have been one of Kobayashi's better games, but Qian deserves full credit for making the most of his opportunity.




Figure 4 (141-183)

'I get into the best four, but I always lose in Osaka,' lamented Kobayashi to Hashimoto Uтарo at the party held after the games. The semifinals are always held in Osaka, and this was the third time Kobayashi had lost in them.

After his excellent performance in defeating Hane, Rin Kaiho, Ishida Yoshio, and Kobayashi, it was a great pity that Qian's health failed him. As far as we know, he still has not resumed tournament play in China.

White resigns after Black 183..

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

This concludes the coverage of the 4th Fujitsu Cup begun in GW64. We have some news about the 5th Fujitsu Cup. Michael Redmond has defeated Jimmy Cha in the North American playoff for the second year in a row, so he gets another chance to prove himself in the international arena.

In the Japanese qualifying tournament, the main interest was the performance of three great old-timers. Hashimoto Uтарo, at 84 surely the oldest active professional go player in history, reached the semifinals, but lost to Yamada Wakio 6-dan. Yamada met Otake in the playoff. Sakata Eio (aged 71) reached the final, where he played Yoda. Fujisawa Shuko (aged 66) met Kato in another final. Ishida Yoshio was matched against Kobayashi Satoru in the fourth final for non-seeded players. Winners of the four places are: Otake, Yoda, Shuko, and Ishida.

Rin v. Lee: The 3rd Tongyang Securities Cup

The first two games of the 3rd Tongyang Securities Cup were played in Taipei in September. The final promised to be a very interesting clash, pitting Rin Kaiho (playing for Chinese Taipei) against Lee Changho of Korea. Based on current form, the 49-year-old Rin is probably the top player of his age group. The 16-year-old Lee Changho is already more than a prodigy: he has proved that he is one of the world's top players.

The best-of-five final has lived up to expectations so far, with two very close games and one win each. Perhaps the most impressive feature of the play is the way in which Lee has been able to match the maturity and experience of Rin. Lee's international experience is beginning to pay off.

Game One

White: Lee Changho 5-dan (Korea)

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan (Chinese Taipei)

Played in Taipei on 18 September 1991.

Commentary by O Meien 8-dan.

Figure 1 (1-28). *Rin plays the Takemiya style.*

Lee Changho is the type of player who plays patiently and shows his strength in the latter part of the game. Facing him while in the midst of the Meijin title match could not have been an easy task for Rin.

Black 9 is the Takemiya style. Black 1 in *Dia.* 1 is the usual move, but recently attaching at 4 is considered a good strategy. Presumably Rin wanted to avoid this.






Figure 1 (1-28)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (29-50)

45: connects

Figure 2 (29-50). Black's attack loses a tempo.

Black 31 is a good guess.

Large moyos doesn't seem to worry Lee. Instead of 32, I'd want to reduce the moyo every

bit I could, so I'd go in at 36.

Black 33 is slack, I think. Black loses a tempo when he attacks with 35 and 37 after White has jumped to 34. If Black uses 33 to attack immediately at 1 in *Dia. 2*, he gets an excellent position up to 7. The game is not interesting for Black unless he can play 5 in the centre.

Black permits White 38 and 40, which enable White to settle his group efficiently up to 46. No matter how you look at it, Black has been outplayed.



Rin Kaiho

Born in Shanghai on 6 May 1942. Came to Japan in 1952, made shodan in 1955, 9-dan in 1967. In 1965 became the youngest Meijin in history by defeating Sakata 4-2; has won the Meijin title a record eight times. Also took the Honinbo title from Sakata in 1968, becoming the second Meijin-Honinbo of tournament history. Has won the Honinbo title a total of five times. In all, Rin has won 29 titles to date (6th overall).




Figure 3 (51-79)







Figure 4 (80-109)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (51-79). A fresh attack puts Black on top.

Instead of 52, White A also looks good.

White 54 is doubtless a big move, but wouldn't pushing down at 58 be thicker?

White 62 is dubious. This move is probably meant to make some contribution to defending the left side, but judging by the result it is almost useless. Instead of 62, White 1 in Dia. 3 is a good move — in fact, it works perfectly. If the sequence to 11 followed, White would have no grounds for dissatisfaction. Having to live with 66 is painful.

Black 67 becomes sente. If White omits 68, Black B will be troublesome.

Black has everything his own way on the left side, destroying the territory with 69 to 79. At this stage, I'd prefer to hold black.

After initially failing to attack the centre group effectively, Black has recovered and forced White into submission with 66. It makes you realize what a powerful player Rin is.

Figure 4 (80-109). Shrewd moves by both

I can't exactly put my finger on the reason, but 80 and 82 look like clever moves.

Crawling into the corner at 97 is very big.

White 102 shows fine attention to detail. If Black plays 103 at 1 in Dia. 4, White can live in the corner with 2 to 6.

Black 107 is a sente move promised by 97. Playing it before answering at 109 shows very good timing. If White omits 108, Black can attack with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5. That would be unbearable: Black not only destroys territory but also menaces the life of the whole group.

Figure 5 (110-200). A close contest

White cuts with 12, uses this stone as a sacrifice, then defends at 18. This impressed me as very clever technique. There is the question of whether White 10 or jumping to 22 at the bottom is bigger, but I can't say either way.

White 94 is the only move. I view the small trade to 100 as even.




Figure 5 (110–200)




Figure 6 (201–271)

Figure 6 (201–271). *An untouchable half point*

The contest was very close, a half-pointer, but White wasn't given a chance after Black took the lead in Figure 3. The final margin was close only because White caught up in the endgame.

Black wins by half a point.
(Kido, November 1991)

Game Two

The second game of the final was also very interesting. Lee played with a mixture of boldness and prudence and came out on top in another close contest. Unfortunately, we can offer only a very brief commentary.

White: Rin Kaiho
Black: Lee Changho
Played in Taipei on 20 September 1991.



Rin takes the first game of the final




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

Lee is in a very aggressive mood in this game, judging by his immediate invasion at 17 and his cap at 39.

Instead of 22, blocking at 29 is usual. Rin's strategy with 22 to 26 ends in failure.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100)

White is probably satisfied when he settles his right-side group and also solidifies his top left corner.

Oeda Yusuke, who visited Taipei with Rin, had this comment on the cause of Rin's loss: 'White 64, letting Black play 65, was slack. I would have liked to see White play more

severely, with 64 at A.'

Instead of enclosing the centre when White encroaches with 66 and 70, Black plunges into White's bottom position with 69 and 77, reminding us that both these players are known for territorial go rather than large moyos.

Black 83 is dubious. Simply playing 85 is superior: Black loses his lead when White makes the ponnuki with 84 and 86.

Black 93. Note that Black can't block at 94: White cuts to the left of 93.




Figure 3 (101-150)




Figure 4 (151-200)

Figure 3 (101-150)

Black tunnels under White's positions with 99 in Figure 2 and 3 here. Kim In 9-dan com-

mented that the position in this figure seemed favourable for Black, thanks to the territory he secured on the right side and in the centre.

Figure 4 (151–200)

White 66 is the losing move. White would still be in the game if he played at 71 instead.

Figure 5 (201–245)

Go Weekly's summing-up: 'The impression we got of Lee Changho from these two games was not one of a soaring prodigy but of a talented young man who combines boldness and prudence.'

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.
(*Go Weekly*, 15 October 1991)




Figure 5 (201–245)

The 46th Honinbo Title Match

Cho v. Kobayashi

The 1991 Honinbo title match represented Kobayashi's third challenge for the Honinbo title and his second attempt to realize his ambition of holding the top three titles simultaneously. The only player to have done this so far is Cho Chikun, the same person who has rebuffed each of Kobayashi's Honinbo challenges.

Kobayashi's six Kisei wins in a row have clearly established him as the top player in Japan, but his failure to add the Honinbo title to his laurels has been a nagging source of dissatisfaction for him.

Kobayashi made the following comments before the match: 'Holding the triple crown of Honinbo, Kisei, and Meijin is a go player's dream. I realize that a chance like this won't come along so often in a lifetime. I hope to make the most of it.'

'I lost the Tengen title match at the end of last year and dropped some good games in the Kisei title match. It's often said that after five years at the top in the go world you lose form because of accumulated fatigue. This was true of Ishida Yoshio and also of Cho. So I some-

times wonder if my turn is coming. . . .



'Last year Cho lost the fourth game in a funny way, so I thought . . . but Cho's the type of player whose strength increases by 30% when he has his back to the wall. I woke up to this too late. Even so, you have to admire Cho and Rin for the way they play with all their might. They are like "warriors". . . . In severity and determination, Cho is probably number

one. My own go has a tendency to become slack, which often causes me to lose, but this time I'm going to watch this and try to play all-out.'

In titles matches between these two, the honours so far were more or less even. Kobayashi took the 1985 Meijin and 1986 Kisei titles from Cho, but lost the 1982 and 1990 Honinbo title matches. As far as minor titles are concerned, Kobayashi beat Cho in the 1977 Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) and 1987 Haya-go Championship titles and lost the 1986 Haya-go Championship and the 1987 Tengen titles. That makes a total score of 4-4 in title matches. Their record in all games since their first clash in 1968 stood at 38-33 in Kobayashi's favour.

For Cho too, of course, a lot hung on this title match, especially because at present it is his only title. Cho held the Honinbo title for two years in a row in 1981-82 and had now duplicated that feat with wins in 1989 and 1990. He was hoping to join the six previous players (Takagawa, Sakata, Rin, Ishida, Kato, and Takemiya) to hold the title for three years or more in a row. In an interview for the Mainichi he commented: 'I expected Kobayashi to become the challenger before the league even started. When he won his first three games, I thought it was already decided. After five wins in a row, he stumbled, dropping a game [by half a point to Rin], but that just made for a more dramatic conclusion to the league when he won his final game [against Yoda] by half a point.'



'Last year my win was just a fluke — the gods granted me an extension of time. This time I had hoped to be able to say that I would

win "as a matter of course", but to be honest my go recently has not been inspired, so I don't have the confidence. Compared to the days when I won everything, the creative tension is different. . . .

'There'd be nothing funny about Kobayashi winning, but if I can concentrate in the hand-to-hand fighting, I think I have a chance. This match will be a long page from my life in which I have to do my best so that whatever happens on the go board we can respect each other once it's over.'

The mystifying feature of this title match was Cho's strange play in the first two games. According to other professionals, he was deliberately playing less than optimal moves, in a spirit of experimentation. This is a difficult problem for amateurs to understand, but we hope that the commentary by Ishida Yoshio on the first game will provide some insight into it.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei, Meijin & Gosei

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Komi: 5 1/2; **time:** 8 hours each.

Played in Tokyo on 10, 11 May 1991.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

In my public commentary on this game at the Nihon Ki-in, I said that in this game go is 'being treated like a hobby'. I wasn't referring to Kobayashi's play. It was Cho who inspired my candid comment.

Cho went out of his way to place himself in difficult positions. If one were to say that his play was free and unrestrained and heedless of the result, it might sound good, but there are limits.


Otake commented: 'Cho is searching for something. He's deliberately playing variations he knows are bad. By putting himself in a painful position, he's groping for something.'

This is the favourable interpretation of a senior player. When I am shown a game like the one here, I feel like shouting, 'Cho! What do you think you're doing?'

The reference diagram shows Cho's 43rd move. He is challenging White to a ko fight

with 1, but by this point the game is already bad for Black: he has overindulged in his 'hobby'. This is not a bold challenge — rather, the truth of the matter is that there's nothing else for Black to do. In the end, Black won the ko, but Cho himself knows full well that it is not normally a ko Black can win.

This can fittingly be called a strange and unusual game. I'm not praising it, of course.



Ref. Dia.




Figure 1 (1-25)


Figure 1 (1-25). Flouting common sense

Black 3. Cho also tried the immediate approach move in Game One of this year's Judan title match. There's nothing wrong with this experimental spirit, but anyone can see


that the continuation of 9 is a bad move. The result is equivalent to White's playing 8 at 10, Black 11, White 8, after which Black plays 9. Common sense dictates that Black 9 should be a two-space pincer at A. Cho, of course, is well aware of this.

Black 13. Again a pincer at A would be the usual move. Isn't it obvious that when Black plays 13 White will pincer at 14? Once again Cho seems to be treating go like a hobby.


Black can hardly invade at the 3-3 point, so he makes a second approach move at 15. From White's point of view, even the very slack joseki of *Dia. 1* might be good enough, as the direction of play is good. However, the opponent will coolly take territory, so Kobayashi prefers 16 and 18. After the joseki to 24, both sides will be very concerned about the ko *aji*. White is perhaps a little reluctant to play 24 at 1 in *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Black switches to 25. If White makes a hane above 25, then Black's stone at 9 won't look so bad, but there's no reason for White to go along with Black.

Instead of 25, Black 1 in *Dia. 3* looks

natural. If White 2, Black can pincer at 3; if instead White 'a', Black can invade at 'b'.

In short, Black 25 can be called unnatural. In effect, Cho Honinbo has played strangely in three corners. I understand his wanting to try something different, but in this case nothing good has come of it. Right from the outset, a feeling of oddness pervades this game. Kobayashi has absolutely no reason to be dissatisfied with his start.




Figure 2 (26-50)
ko: 47, 50

Figure 2 (26-50). The only thing left to do

White may have started well, but Black is, as can easily be imagined, aiming at the ko on the top left. The play at the bottom is related to this. With both players racking their brains, a new pattern emerges up to 40. Black next turns the right side into a *moyo* with 41, then takes the plunge with 43.


Let's take a closer look at the pattern on the bottom right.

Black 31 is natural. If Black plays 33 at 36, the sequence in *Dia. 4* follows. White can't play 4 at 'a', as the ladder is unfavourable. Black therefore captures the corner white stones, but now he can no longer fight the ko in the upper left, as White gets too many ko threats.


White 34. If at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black squeezes, and a difficult fight follows. White 34 may be a new move. White is doing his best to avoid giving Black ko threats. However, when White

plays underneath with 34 and 36, Black feels tempted to sacrifice his scattered stones here, going for a *moyo* on the right side instead.

Black 43 doesn't strike me as a bold move. Rather, there's nothing else that stands out. To me, this looks like a tough game for Black.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

7: connects





Figure 3 (51-63)

Figure 3 (51-63). A slip leads to an upset.


The ko should be a win for White. Basically, this is considered a fight in which it is very hard for Black to win even if he cuts. However, Black starts the fight out of sheer exasperation.

To make a long story short, White should have used 52 to connect at 1 in *Dia. 6*. The dif-

ference between Black's winning the ko and White's connecting is enormous, so it's best for White not to think of anything. Apparently Kobayashi was worried that if played later the *kosumi* of 3 would not be sente, but it can't be bad for White if he captures the two black stones. If Black 4, White secures the corner with 5 and 7. Instead of 4 –



Dia. 6



Dia. 7
8, 13: ko


Dia. 7. If Black resists with 1, another ko starts with 2 and 4. Descending at 6 creates a lot of ko threats; if Black plays 11 immediately, the continuation to 19 is likely. This result is good for White. Black's only gain is on the right side, but White has made gains in two places: connecting with the marked stone and breaking through on the bottom left.

Black 53 and 55 are shrewd: they punish White for his detour. However, this exchange

is not enough in itself to upset White's lead. My feeling is that it has just kept Black's chances alive, earned him some breathing space.

The problem arises immediately after this.

Invading the right side is natural, but what is one to make of White 60? For a moment I couldn't believe my eyes — could this be a Kobayashi move? Connecting at 61 is thick; Black 63 then blocks White's path into the centre. White's lead has clearly been upset. The game now seems easier for Black.







Figure 4 (64-72)




Dia. 9

Figure 4 (64-72). An obtuse move, another upset


Black has the lead, a line to victory for him has become clearly visible, but in this figure Cho spoils everything. The chief villains are 65, 67, and 69. Black 65 and 69 achieve nothing beyond linking up, while there's no need for haste with 67. These moves are so foolish you want to cover your eyes. I would like the reader to compare them to the moves White plays during the same period, namely, 66, 68, and 72. Black's three moves are almost criminal. I am in complete agreement with the comments of the players later that Black should have used 65 to follow Dia. 9. This would expand his lower side, and he could

look forward to attacking the weak white group on the top left. By following this diagram, it wouldn't be so difficult for a player like Cho to get a win.

Even so, why did Black allow the cap of 72? Instead of 67, Black should have jumped to 1 in Dia. 10 or pushed along with Black 2. That would be so much better than Black 'a'.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Even with 69 Black should jump to 1 in Dia. 11. The result might not be as good as in Dia. 10, but my feeling is that the issue would still be undecided. It would probably be promising for Black.

At the outset I stated that this was a strange, mysterious game. Starting out in the realm of the hobbyist, Black has fought his way through a difficult situation by means of a ko, then at one stroke got promising prospects from a slip by his opponent. Then, in the next instant, he crashed to earth again.

Cho was apparently very upset at missing the chance to follow Dia. 9, but what is the use of regrets when you yourself are to blame? I agree with his own assessment that after this figure there is no possibility of a win for Black. Apparently there was a theory that the game was still close, but that doesn't mean anything more than that it was close. I believe that after the cap at 72 the game is unlosable for White.

The rest of the moves are, for Cho, empty of meaning.



Defying conventional wisdom leads to an unhappy result for Cho, but at least he's caught the attention of Kataoka Satoshi.





Figure 5 (73–108)

Figure 5 (73–108), Figure 6 (109–148)

White harasses the black group, making it live small, and in the end his group on the top left does not come under much pressure.

Concerning Black 17 in Figure 6, the opinion was expressed that the game would still have been close if Black had followed Dia. 12. That's what Kato said in *Go Weekly*, and apparently the Mainichi newspaper commentator

Kataoka said the same thing. However, White could move out at 10 at his leisure, and there's no win for Black. Well, it might be countable, but that's all. I think it's a futile variation that Cho just didn't feel like playing.



Dia. 12

Pursuing White with Black A after 48 in Figure 6 doesn't lead anywhere. I would like to ask the reader to study it for himself. Black has neatly set the scene for resignation. Instead of calling this a 'foolish game', I venture to label it a 'strange game'. If Cho keeps play-

ing like this, the series will be over in a flash. That wouldn't be interesting or amusing.

Indulging in a hobby is fine, but if Cho thinks that that's the way to beat Kobayashi Kisei, he's sadly mistaken. Originality should be harnessed in a positive way. There are good hobbies and wasteful hobbies.

My commentary has been harsh on Cho, but that's because I expect a high standard from a Kobayashi-Cho game — there's no malice. After all, these two are the twin peaks of contemporary go.

Black resigns after White 148.

(Kido, July 1991)




Figure 6 (109-148)

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played at Gero Spa in Gifu Prefecture on 7, 8 June 1991.

Commentary by Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). *Cho shows a disdain for convention.*

White 22 is the decisive move of the opening. Even after he makes the invasion, however, Cho, in characteristic fashion, goes all-out for territory with 26 and 28. Only after he has made his forcing moves from the top does he try to settle his invading stone with the crosscut of 34 and 36.

In this game too Cho surprises the spec-

tators with a stubborn move that makes things difficult for himself. Anyone can see that White 42 is heavy: it invites Black to strike at the vital point of 43. Why does Cho go out of his way to expose himself to danger?





Figure 1 (1-50)

41: connects



Dia. 1

The ordinary approach here, according to Yamashiro, would be to skip sideways to 1 in Dia. 1, lightly reducing the black moyo. (Note that Black might play 4 at 'a'.) This would give an even game.

Cho is known for his dislike of the conventional, but avoiding it here seems to be asking for trouble.

Kobayashi welcomes the opportunity, attacking with sharpness and precision.

Figure 2 (51-78). *Black turns on the pressure.*

The cut of 51 was well-timed. Cho, being Cho, refused to compromise, defending the side with 52 and 54. Kobayashi then took 50 minutes on 55, a very slow move for him.






Figure 2 (51-78)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

White 56. If at 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will counter with 2 and 4 — this looks bad for White. Moving out bluntly as in *Dia. 3* is little better: Black secures his capture and White is still eyeless. That leaves 56 as the only move. The advantage of changing the order of moves from *Dia. 3* is that White gets to push up at 60, so he can cut at 62.

White 64 was the sealed move. Cho settled in for what was obviously going to be a long think (107 minutes). After a while Kobayashi got up and went into the pressroom, where he started going over the first game of the series with Yamashiro.

The white group is close to being settled after 72, but Black has built enormous centre thickness. The players in the pressroom agreed that Black was ahead, but it's possible that Cho was satisfied with his progress in rescuing his group.





Figure 3 (79-103)



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (79-103). An ambitious attack provokes a brilliancy.

White 84 leads to the crucial scene of the game. This surprise attack is the start of a bold attempt to settle his group in sente. The straightforward move is White A, which looks forward to White 96 and White 85. This takes the most territory in settling the group.

Black 85. Connecting at 1 in *Dia. 4* is not good: this is what White wants. Up to 12 he creates eye-shape; if Black 'a', he makes his

second eye with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd' (note that Black can't counter with 'c' at 'd' because of his shortage of liberties). Black might get sente to play first in the centre, but White would be left with a big endgame move at 'e'.

If you think about it, starting out with the peep on the inside at 84 is unnatural: White loses points at the outset, so this is not a pretty technique. Something has gone wrong with Cho's aesthetic eye. That's why he commented he should have played at A. That is the true shape of go.

As he revealed after the game, Cho analysed an enormous number of variations in this corner fight. The only thing missing from all of them was the wedge of 89.

White is forced to play 90 to 94. The game has been decided.

Figure 4 (104-143). A comfortable lead

Black 11. If at A, White lives with B (Black connects, White 11).

White has been forced to live with the minimum eye space, so Black has achieved his original objective.

Kobayashi was perhaps ten points ahead on the board, commented one professional. He was right on the money.




Figure 4 (104-143)

Figure 5 (144-212). A confidence-building win

This was Kobayashi's second easy win in two games: he could hardly have asked for a better start to his Honinbo challenge.

Of course, in 1982 he took a 2-1 lead (see GW29) and last year a 3-1 lead (GW61, 62), so he wouldn't have been counting his chickens yet.

Black wins by 4 1/2 points.
(Adapted from the Mainichi)



Cho manages a smile despite the bad loss he has suffered. Watching (right of Kobayashi) are Tsuchida 9-dan, Kobori Keiji, the go writer, Yamashiro 9-dan, and Iwata 9-dan.




Figure 5 (144–212)

69: connects (at 64)

White wins and connects the ko.



Kobayashi gets one foot inside the door of the Honinbo pagoda. (Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Chikun

Played in Nagasaki on 7, 8 June 1991.

Commentary by Kamimura Haruo 9-dan.

This was a very busy time for Kobayashi. He played the Fujitsu Cup quarterfinal in Beijing on 1 June, then his mother-in-law, Kitani Miharu, died on 3 June, and her funeral was held on 4 June. Then on 6 June he had to fly to Nagasaki for this game. It wouldn't have been surprising if he was feeling the strain a little.

This game features a startling trade of groups or *furikawari* late in the middle game.





Figure 1 (1–28)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1–28). Borrowing the opponent's fuseki

Versatility in the fuseki is one of the features of Cho's game. In this game, his versatility extends to making use of his opponent's favourite pattern.

Black 13. Switching here before the joseki at the bottom is completed is an interesting strategy. This move was played by China's Ma Xiaochun in a game against Cho. Countering with the pincer of 14 is natural.

White 20. This kind of one-space jump is typical of Kobayashi: his position may look cramped, but that doesn't worry him.

Black 21 was Cho's first slow move (52 minutes). This is a difficult point. If Black responds with his own one-space jump, that is,

1 in *Dia. 1*, White will counter with the standard combination of 2 and 4, enabling him to break through into the centre. That would be very bad for Black. The continuation to 28 in the figure may seem similar, but it is better for Black than the diagram, as White advances one line less into the centre. That in turn places less of a burden on Black in looking after his groups above and below. (Cho probably spent a lot of his time considering the merits of sealing White in with 3 at 'a' in *Dia. 1*, followed by White 'b', Black 9.)




Figure 2 (29-50)

Figure 2 (29-50). Tokyo tower

Black seeks compensation for White's breakthrough by applying pressure to the top white group with 29. However, White comes up with a clever counter in 34. This provoked two hours two minutes of thought from Cho.

Black 37. The sealed move. On the first day Cho used four hours six minutes to Kobayashi's two hours six minutes. The total of 37 moves was the fewest ever in a Kobayashi-Cho game, though the first day of a Cho-Rin game once produced only 17 moves.

The general feeling was that the result to 44 favoured White. Referring to White's shape on the left side, Kobayashi said after the game: 'I didn't feel any dissatisfaction. Because this is like Tokyo Tower'

The players in the pressroom were puzzling over Black's next move when Kamimura Haruo 9-dan exclaimed: 'I've found a good

move!' It was 45, which Cho played. This sets up the capture of two white stones, providing Black with some insurance, whereupon Black switches to 47.

The players in the pressroom were surprised when White 50 was shown on the TV monitor. The first reaction, 'It's the proper move,' changed to, 'Isn't it a little slack?' and 'Kobayashi's usual over-optimism has appeared again.' The move is indeed slack: White should first attack at A, provoking Black B, then play 50. Cho is happy to get the chance to play the excellent move of Black 51 in Figure 2.






Figure 2 (51-70)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (51-70). Kobayashi is too optimistic.

White 52 is worse than 50, however. It's virtually the losing move. It was the first move about which Kobayashi expressed regrets after the game.

White must crawl at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If Black 2, he then pushes up with 3; after 5, he should be able to harass the black group.

Kobayashi overlooked the effectiveness of Black 53. Black easily makes shape with 55 to 59. The opinion in the pressroom shifted dras-

tically: it was now agreed that Black had the lead.

Black 63 is the only move: A or 70 would make Black overconcentrated.

White 68 (57 minutes) was Kobayashi's slowest move of the game. It is risky, as Black can later attack the corner as in *Dia. 3*; if White 'a', the corner is in danger after Black 'b', so White will play a ko with White 'c', Black 'b'. The point is that White can't play a compromise move instead of 68 now that he is behind.

White 70. Black A would be big after Black 63.





Figure 3 (71-104)



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (71-104). Cho refuses to compromise.

Black 71 and 73 are severe, so White goes for the corner territory.

Capturing the two white stones up to 81 maintains Black's lead. The players in the pressroom thought that the game was unlosable for Black, but unknown to them Cho was upset with his play here.

Cho had realized that 79 was too facile.

White 80 and 82 are not only big in themselves, they are also a source of uneasiness for Black. Instead of 79, Black should have blocked at 1 in *Dia. 4*. Black 3 is sente, so Black gets excellent shape with 5. White does get more territory on the right side, but the reason why 1 here is superior will become apparent soon enough. However, Cho's missing this variation does make the game more dramatic.

Cho went into *byo-yomi* on 89.

White 90 was well-timed. In reply, Black 94 would have been safe, but such docility would have been unbearable for Cho, already irritated with himself because of 79.

On 103, Cho was down to his final minute.





Figure 4 (105-123)

18: ko



Dia. 5


Figure 4 (105-123). In a flash the lead is reversed.

Cho goes wrong with 5. Correct is Black 1 in *Dia. 5*. This captures the four white stones, the only problem being that White 2 will be sente, as will White 'a' (aiming at 'b'), because of the threat of a capturing race.

A major *furikawari* (trade) follows the ko threat of 19. The resulting black territory on the bottom left is roughly equivalent to White's at the centre top, but when you con-

sider that White's bottom left group had bad *aji* to begin with and that Black's top right group looks like coming under attack, it's clear that White has gained a lot.

Kobayashi commented later that he thought he was now in the game.



Dia. 6




Figure 5 (124-172)

Figure 5 (124-172). *Over-optimistic?*


The time for the evening break came up while Kobayashi was considering 26, but the players agreed to play on.

White's play from 24 on is too facile: he lets Black make a lot of territory up to 41. Perhaps Kobayashi had fallen into his old habit of over-optimism. He should have played more aggressively with 24, extending to 1 in Dia. 6 or attaching at A.

White 44 is a good move. If Black answers

at 1 in Dia. 7, White forces with 2; White 4 then poses the threat of a ko at 'a', so it is virtually sente.

White 46. Kobayashi missed his last chance to make a game of it by connecting at 47, either because he had miscounted the score or because he thought that White 47 would fail. Black would answer White 47 with Black 51 or 52, but he can't get two eyes, so a *semeai* would follow. After the game the players couldn't work out the definitive variation; the best they could do was to conclude that with correct play Black would 'probably win'.



Dia. 7




Figure 6 (173-234)

Figure 6 (173-234). *A surprisingly large margin*

The lead changed four times in this game. After 47, Cho played the endgame solidly and gave Kobayashi no further chances. The final margin was surprisingly large and mainly due to the size of Black's bottom right territory, confirmation that 24 was indeed slack.

The difference between 3-0 and 2-1 is enormous: the result of this game changed the flow of the match.

Black wins by 10 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Mainichi)



Cho looks tired, Kobayashi looks rueful. Craning his neck for a view is Kamimura Haruo.

Game Four

Our commentary on the fourth game takes the form of a joint analysis by O Meien 8-dan and Oya Koichi 7-dan. The latter is a disciple of Kobayashi Koichi. The *Kido* reporter is Kobori Keiji.

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played at Yamanaka hot spring, Ishikawa Prefecture, on 27, 28 June 1991.




Figure 1 (1-9)

Figure 1 (1-9). Seeking the reason for the loss

O Meien: This game is a masterpiece for Cho Sensei. I get an impression from it very similar to that from the second Kisei game when he had his major injury (10th Kisei title, 1986 — see GW44).

Oya Koichi: There are no bad moves by White to be found.

OM: Cho Sensei can play a masterpiece any time he feels like it.

Kido: Oya, has the fuseki pattern of the niren-sei of 1 and 3 combined with 5 and 7 been studied a lot at the Kobayashi study group?

OK: We haven't looked at it at all. This is a relatively new pattern, so . . .

Kido: In Game Two, White played 8 at A.

OM: When you play the splitting move (*wariuchi*) of 8, you have no severe follow-up. So I feel that Black 9 is too persistent. Trying to play out the right side with 9 having already played out the bottom with the low move of 7 . . . [Play out (*uchikiru*) means finishing off a position so that neither side has an urgent continuation.]

OK: You mean the left side is bigger?

OM: Hm. I'd consider B and C. Looking at it logically, the approach move of B is big in this position. Of course, Kobayashi Sensei knows all this a hundred times better than me.

Kido: Kobayashi Kisei first plays out one area, then the next. But trying to pin his loss on 9...

OM: I'm not talking about differences in style, just the logic of go.





Figure 2 (9-33)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (9-33). Takemiya's brilliant suggestion

OK: What happens if Black uses 9 to make an approach move on the top left?

OM: What pincer will Cho play? Probably the close-up pincer of 2 in *Dia. 1* rather than 'a'.

OK: Right. I thought the strategy in the game was also reasonable. Black 11 — Sensei always makes the low answer. White 12 is early, but you want to go in.

Kido: How is the result to 25?

OM: Locally Black is not dissatisfied.


OK: That's right. Even if Black plays 15 at 17, White 18, Black 15... and you get the same result. Even if White attaches at 18 instead of 16, then you get the same with Black 17 (!), White 16.

Kido: White then tries to settle his stone at the top with the two-step hane.


OM: This is the key area. The result in the game (up to 43 in *Figure 3*) is not impressive for Black. Instead of 29, I'd connect at 1 in *Dia. 2*.

OK: White 2 is the only move.

OM: Switching to A in the figure is big. In the game White gets to take the large point on the left side.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Kido: What about 31 at 1 in *Dia. 3*?

OK: That's easily refuted, thanks to the marked stone. Black loses the capturing race.

OM: But I was impressed with the comment made by Takemiya Sensei that Black should play 31 at B. Putting aside the question of whether it's better or not, this wouldn't occur to someone like me.

OK: They were looking at this. What happens?


OM: It's difficult, but White will cut at 6 in *Dia. 4*, and Black will fight with 9 and 11. Something like the continuation to 23 can be expected. There are various problems along the way, but it seems to me this is better than the game sequence.

OK: When the centre white group is floating like this, Black's bottom area will expand.

OM: You agree? This variation tells a consistent story. Maybe Kobayashi is the type of player who doesn't consider variations like this.


Kido: Does that mean *Dia. 2* or 4 was better for Black?

OM: No, *Dia. 2* is commonplace. If the result in *Dia. 4* is superior to the game, I'd go for it.




Dia. 4
7: ko

OM: White switched to the large point of 44. This is big.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

OK: In the sequence to 44, Black's bottom moyo has disappeared.

OM: Answering Black 45 by forcing with 46 and 48 is very unusual. As a rule Cho avoids settling the shape like this. If White 46 and 48 had been played first, Black would probably have switched 45 to the inside approach move [3 in Dia. 6].

OK: Even in the position in the game, most people would make the inside approach move, I think... Jump to 1 in Dia. 6 first, then play 3. Most professionals would make this inside approach move. Kobayashi Sensei is the outside-approach-move type, but something about this jarred.




Figure 3 (34-63)

Figure 3 (34-63). Why did he descend?


OK: There's something we can be more definite about, though. Black answered 34 by descending at 35, but isn't connecting the only move?

OM: Is the continuation the same if he connects?


OK: H'm. Dia. 5. This is what is likely. If so, it's better to have a stone at 1 than at 'a'.

OM: I see. That's clear enough.

OK: Kato Sensei was also saying this, that the aim of a move like 35 is to attack. But White gouges out the corner and after 42 is immune to attack, so 35 is funny. You could probably find the cause of Black's loss in the play around here.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

OM: Locally, Black is dissatisfied with the result from 51 to 62. If Black hane at 1 in Dia. 7, Cho Sensei would probably cut. The moves

to 17 follow. White has the *aji* of the approach-move ko with White 'a' through 'e' for later; even without it, this result is favourable for White. Note that 17 is the only move — blocking at Black 'e' is worst.

Kido: Is the hane of 1 in *Dia. 8* the joseki for White 58? He gets to switch to the key point of 5.

OM: Black's cut at 6 puts him on the spot. That's the old joseki — the hane of 58 or the extension to White A is the correct move. In this game, the moves from 58 to 62 seem appropriate. Even so, I wonder if Black really had no other choice. [With Oya's help, O looked at a number of different variations, but to no avail — none gave Black a good result. The play in the figure seems correct.]






Figure 4 (64-100)



Dia. 9
8: connects



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (64-100). Two 'painful' places

OM: The result on the top right and the result on the top left were both painful for Black locally. But Black was satisfied with the opening exchange in the bottom right corner.

OK: Overall, it looks like a disagreeable game for Black.

Kido: White cuts with 64 and 66. The *sabaki* on the left side is the highlight of the middle game.

OK: How about competing in territory by playing 65 at 1 in *Dia. 9*? Surely White won't challenge him to a ko [cutting with 8 instead of connecting]. White also goes for territory with 12.

OM: No, Black has no hope of winning this way. White's left-side territory really swells up.

OK: It's hard for Black to secure a really big territory at the bottom. Because White is so strong on the top right.

OM: Going way ahead, what about Black 75 and 77?

OK: A little heavy? I agree with Kato Sensei's theory that Black should make a counter-hane at 78.

OM: If White 'a' in answer to Black 1 in *Dia. 10*, blocking at Black 'b' is OK. If White connects at 2, continue in the same way as in the game, then connect at 9. This result would be better than the game. But Black undoubtedly was worried that White might use 2 to invade at 'c'.

OK: That invasion is all the severer if White gets to extend at 4 or turn at 3.

OM: Even if White switches elsewhere with 2, Black doesn't have any remarkable follow-up.

OK: I see. Black was afraid of taking gote with 1.

OM: I thought that the way Black settled himself in the game was the best he could hope for. Living like this may seem painful, but in reality Black is trying his hardest.

OK: It's bad for Black, but maybe it's quite close.

Figure 5 (101-130). White can't lose.

OM: Up to 3 neither side can do better, I think.

OK: This is the place. I really admired White 4 and 6. I was 'playing through the



Kobayashi hands the sealed move (67) to the referee, Hane 9-dan.

game record from the newspaper report with some friends yesterday, and the opinion of everyone was that White should play A.





Figure 5 (101-130)

OM: But, Oya Sensei, if you were actually playing, even you would play 4 and 6, surely. Doesn't White 1 in Dia. 11 feel bad? Well, I guess Black will play 2 and 4.


OK: White will naturally want to crawl in at 5. Let's play out the endgame. [The conclusion was that Black can win by only a little on the board.]

OM: Really? Then the game was an easy one for White to win. But Cho Sensei is playing solidly. One other problem is, as mentioned in the newspaper report on the players' review of the game, what about extending at

20 instead of 17. Kobayashi Sensei commented that that way the game would still have been close.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

OK: In *Dia. 12* there's the problem of Black 'a'. [Note: The players found that this variation gave White a win by 1 1/2 points.]

OM: However, Black has 'a', so let's see what happens if White drops back to 'b' instead of 4. [Note: The players found that after White 4 at 'b', the game was close to being a half-pointer, but the conclusion was that White looked like winning.]

OK: The comment that extending would have made the game close was correct.

OM: Well, then, does that mean that *Dia. 11* would have been the most clear-cut? I don't really understand this, but in any case there doesn't seem to be a loss for White. You can still call this a masterpiece for Cho.




Figure 6 (131–200)

Figures 6, 7. A masterpiece, after all

Kido: Listening to your discussion, it sounded as if the game was really bad for Black, yet it turned out to be quite close.

OM: Black's play didn't look attractive (laughter), so it felt very bad, but that wasn't really the case.

OK: Recently there's been something wrong with Kobayashi Sensei's positional judgement. Look at Game 3...

OM: There were, after all, problems in the opening of the game. I wonder, would it be a mistake to query Black 9 in Figure 1?

OK: It didn't strike me there was anything wrong with it. Rather, the descent of Black 35 (in Figure 3) was definitely bad.

OM: That's clear. Let's agree to say that the

cause of the loss was in the play around that point.

White wins by 5 1/2 points.

(Kido, August 1991)




Figure 7 (201–292)

ko (at 44): 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78; 90: connects (at 7); 92: connects (at 45)

With this win, Cho drew level with Kobayashi and made up for his erratic start. Kobayashi was probably quite worried by now: for the third time he had seen his early lead in a Honinbo title match wiped out.

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Chikun

Played at Jozankei Spa, Hokkaido on 3, 4 July 1991.

Commentary by Awaji Shuzo 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–50). Cho monopolizes the corners.

As usual, Cho was spending a lot of time on the fuseki — 61 minutes on 23, 63 minutes on 33 — even though these were standard joseki moves. In the case of the latter, he spent much of the time on a comparison with the alternative joseki of A.

Black 39. Cho already has four corners, yet he expands his territory further with this solid extension rather than playing a high move like B or C (Otake suggested Black 50) that would counteract the influence of White's moyo.

Setting up a large moyo is the natural

response for White, but White 40 and 44 make the game difficult for him. Instead of 40, Awaji suggested White C; Takemiya suggested White D.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1

Otake and Takemiya agreed in advocating 1 in *Dia. 1* instead of 44; Awaji agreed that it was superior to the game.

Figure 2 (51-100). *Invading the moyo*

Black 53. The sealed move. This was the point everyone expected. Observers agreed that the game was looking promising for Black.

White 54. If White blocks below 53, he will lose on territory. Next, White counterattacks with 58. He succeeds in cutting off the centre black group, but it seems in little danger of dying.

White 64. Crawling at A, creating various kinds of *aji* to aim at here, may also have been a good strategy. Awaji and the other players in the pressroom had predicted that White would follow *Dia. 2*. This is not necessarily good for

White, as Black has the contact play of 'a', but it is worth considering.






Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 2

As soon as the game ended, Kobayashi expressed regrets about 78. 'White 78 was unthinking. If I had played White B, Black 78, White C, Black would have found it more difficult to settle his group.' The conclusion was that the sequence to 8 in *Dia. 3* would have followed, which might have allowed White more scope for complications; killing Black seems out of the question, however.



Dia. 3





Figure 3 (101-150)

4: connects



Dia. 4

Dia. 5

Figure 3 (101-150). A joint oversight

Cho secured his second eye with 13 just as he went into *byo-yomi*. That put him about 15 points ahead on the board, so lack of time was not going to be a problem.

Black 17. The reader may wonder why Black didn't attack this group earlier. In fact, he could have killed it. Instead of 7 —

Dia. 4. If Black 1, White can't get two eyes. If White 2, then the continuation shown here is one possibility — White dies. Black has to be able to escape with 17. White will lose any capturing race with the centre black group. Neither player noticed this possibility during the game.

Black 31 is a slip. Black should first play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, as that gives White no scope for variation. Cho thought that changing the order would still give the same result, but Kobayashi seized the opportunity to counterattack with 32 and 34.

Black has to give way with 35. This mistake costs him about five points.

White plays a large reverse-sente endgame move with 48, but Black gets a string of sente moves up to 65 in the next figure.




Figure 4 (151-200)




Figure 5 (201-237)

37: connects

Figures 4, 5. Another convincing win for Cho

In the post-game review, it was very hard to find variations that led to a win for White, so the conclusion seems to be that this game turned bad for Kobayashi in the fuseki. His attempt to play an unfamiliar large-moyo strategy made little headway against Cho.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Mainichi)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Mito City on 17, 18 July 1991.

Commentary by Cho.

Just after I had resigned myself to defeat, my opponent made a major blunder. Winning a game in this fashion is something that happens at best once a decade. It enabled me to defend my title.

It would be a lie if I said I wasn't happy, but, to be honest, I don't really feel I toppled Kobayashi. I've rebuffed his challenge three times in this title, but the only time I felt that it was my play that won the match was the first time, in 1982. Both last year and this year Kobayashi's form was so good that my losing would have been natural. I can only think of the result as mischief by the gods.

Because I was convinced of my own weakness, because I thought it only natural to lose, I made a defiant vow to play the way I wanted to.

Perhaps it's when you can't win that you become stronger. If you think you're going to lose anyway, you seek the slightest possibilities on the go board, you try all kinds of different strategies.

In this match I thrust common sense aside and used 'uncommon sense' as my starting point. I hoped that this would let me expand the potential of go.

Sometimes it occurs to me to wonder just how vast the game of go is. The variations are astronomical, no computer is big enough to contain them. I wonder if we aren't narrowing this vastness with the wisdom we call 'common sense'.

Seeking 'uncommon sense' may be foolish, in thought and in action. But, whether thanks to this or not, I feel that something in go has started to become visible to me.

Figure 1 (1-30). A perplexing extension

After playing the *niren-sei* in Games 2 and 4, Kobayashi reverted to his favourite opening with 1 to 5. Apparently I spent a lot of time on 6. Even though I know I'll be tormented by lack of time in the middle and endgame, I can't cure myself of this habit. This is the way I am.




Figure 1 (1-30)

Besides 6, I considered A, B, and C. It crossed my mind that I'd tried B and C once each in last year's Honinbo title match.

For Black 7, the 'Kobayashi style' had been fixed as Black 18. This zeal for study is typical of Kobayashi. I approve of the *wariuchi* of 7, and I have a feeling that it will become more popular than the approach move of 18. The reason is that making White extend to 10 exposes more openly the weakness of White 4 at the 3-3 point.

Black invades immediately at 13. He's paying me back for my 3-3 invasion in Game 4. The order of moves is a little different, but the result is the same.

Simply defending at 27 is a good move. I had made elaborate plans for my counter if White attached to the left of 2. I had been greedy with 26 and 28 in Game 4 (page 34), but there's no need to go this far. I was impressed with Kobayashi's imposing defence.

I had a lot of trouble choosing between 30 and D. White D builds a wider position and has E next to make good shape. But will White be blessed with the opportunity to play E? Black can invade immediately, and even if he doesn't, he can aim at exploiting White's thinness.

After a lot of agonizing, I chose 30. The potential for development may be inferior, but I opted for a 'tightness' that would let me play more freely later. This policy determined the framework of the game.





Figure 2 (31-44)




Dia. 1

Figure 2 (31-44). Will it become a good move or a bad move?


The pincer of 31 was a good move. This upset my schedule: I had expected Black A. That is the usual move, as White's corner position is exposed. I had planned to answer with White 2 in *Dia. 1*. If Black 3, I was ready with 4. Filling in a liberty with 8 will enable White to make good shape with 'a', so I thought this was reasonable.

When Black plays 31, White can't leisurely jump to 41, as Black A will be an excellent follow-up to 31. That means that 32 is a must, but Black 33 gave me a jolt. I was forced to spend nearly three hours on 38. I was really on the spot.


I took a lot of trouble over 38 and 40. I don't know whether they are the best moves. However, even now I haven't found a substitute plan. These two moves astonished people in the pressroom. I heard that their reputation in Tokyo was reasonable. [They were labeled 'moves that nobody but Cho could think of'.] This is what I thought about.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 2. If White jumps to 1, he will immediately suffer the attack of 2. This contact play is severe. If Black 2 and 4, then White will play 5, but no matter how you look at it this exchange is painful for White. Yet —

Dia. 3. Invading the corner at 1 lets Black make a nice moyo on the right side up to 14, on top of which White hasn't eliminated the threat of Black 'a'.

Dia. 4. White 1, the straightforward way of forestalling the contact play, is bad, because it lets Black attack with 2 to 6. White 38 and 40 are a more aggressive way of forestalling the contact play. If Black plays 41 at B, White jumps to 41, clearly getting a better result than *Dia. 1*.

However, the later development of the game will decide whether 38 and 40 become good moves or bad moves.

Playing 41 at 1 in *Dia. 5* (page 43) ends in gote. Kobayashi disliked the idea of letting White get sente to switch to the right side.



plays 'b' in sente). A stone at 9 is necessary, so White will switch to something like 10 on the side.

In the corner fight, White 48 is a move I am a bit tempted to boast about. You could say that it was because I saw this move that I played 42 and 44. That is, if White plays 1 in *Dia. 7*, then after Black plays 2 and 4 as in the game there is a big difference on the side. Black 'a' is sente, and Black can also play 'b', forcing White 'a'.





Figure 3 (45-81)

Figure 3 (45-81). A move I'm proud of


The fight in the upper right corner comes to a pause after 50. White 40 in Figure 2 has been made to look good, so I felt the result was reasonable. The only thing is that Black gets to play the last large point of the fuseki with 51, so there is not much of a gap between the players.

Apparently the players in the pressroom also examined the possibility of going all-out in the corner by playing 45 at 1 in *Dia. 6*. However, I query the wisdom of letting White push through with 2 and 4 (if Black 3 at 'a', White

Another point: when White plays 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black won't exchange 'a' for White 'b'. He will keep the two forcing moves of 'a' and 'c' open, making it harder for White to do anything on the right side.

For the above reasons, perhaps Kobayashi could have considered omitting Black 49, though the situation is now a little different.

I also agonized over 52. My first instinct was to expand White's *moyo* with one of the points from A to D. That may have been a more imposing strategy than destroying territory as I did in the game. Maybe it's true that one should be able to win playing like that. However, once White has held back with the marked stone he is emotionally drawn to erasing territory rather than *moyo*-building. It occurs to me now that, accepting 52-53 as a good exchange, White E next may be the standard approach. I still feel some dissatisfaction with 52 and 54.



Dia. 9

For Black 65, the move that catches the eye is the 3-3 invasion in *Dia. 9*. But this time White is certain to use his sente to expand his bottom moyo. In this diagram, the marked white stone is still working efficiently; in the game, Black forces with 73 to 77 and makes it a little overconcentrated.

Therefore, Kobayashi's choice of 65 on seems appropriate.




Figure 4 (82-122)


Figure 4 (82-122). The prospect of *shinogi* puts White ahead.

The centre suddenly became blackish in the previous figure. The reducing move of 82 is a bit restrained even by my standards. My first instinct was to play 96. Yes, I probably should have plunged in this far.


Black 85 has a severity typical of Kobayashi: he is taking advantage of my conservative play. However, both sides commit errors in the fight here.

First, White 94. Using this atari to cut at 1 in *Dia. 10* will end in failure. White may cap-


ture four stones with 3 and 5, but letting Black wall off the centre up to 14 is out of the question. That's why I ataried at 94, but the correct move was the atari of 1 in *Dia. 11*. The continuation to 9 is probably best for both sides. At one stroke Black's connection of 95 in the figure makes the game tough for White.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

With 97 it's Kobayashi's turn to go wrong. He should simply extend at 1 in *Dia. 12*. If White 2, pulling back at 3 is good enough. In the game he has added to this the unnecessary exchange of Black 'a' for White 'b'. If Black had his choice later, he'd prefer to force with 'b'.

Saved by Kobayashi's slack move and given the chance to play 122 in the centre, I could see my way clear to settling my centre group. At the same time, I had, I believed, taken the lead, though just by a very small margin. However, a major change in the position was lying in wait for us.





Figure 5 (123-168)

ko: 56, 59, 62, 65



Dia. 13

Figure 5 (123-168). An extremely risky move

White settled the shape on the top left with 24 on. That left only the bottom right corner. I attached at 36 because I considered counterattacking with 37 would not work. But this was a careless and extremely risky move.

If White had played 36 at 37, Black would have answered at A, so White could have forced with White 36, Black B, White C, Black 38, then switched to the top with White 68. That should be enough to give White the lead.

Moreover, White 44 should have been at 45, making *miai* of White 44 and White D. Although White gets to link up with 60 and 66 in exchange for the ko, he has not made any profit. There's no escaping the fact that White 36 is a bad *mochikomi* (loss without compensation).

Black had a do-or-die move — couldn't he have extended at 1 in *Dia. 13*? White has to hane at 4 if he wants to live unconditionally, but then Black can jump to 5 in sente. If White

plays 4 at 'a', Black attaches at 8 and gets a ko. Even now I have no confidence of winning in this variation.

The reason I call 36 extremely risky is because it gives Black the option of following *Dia. 13*. In the game I linked up with 60 and 66, then when I switched to 68 I thought I could see the light at the end of the tunnel, but...





Figure 6 (169-191)



Dia. 14

Figure 6 (169-191). All over!?

The moment I confirmed my prospects of winning, I was cast down to the depths. I turned the game into an irrevocable loss.

Trying to force with 80, which looked forward to connecting at A, was an absurd move. Imagine overlooking the 83-85 combination! It's too ridiculous for words. Three valuable stones were wrested out of my grasp with 85 on. I couldn't be more ashamed of myself.

White 84 at 85 would have been a little better — Black 89, White 84, Black B, White 87 follow. But just a little — if Black forces with

91, then switches to the centre, White can't win.

Even if White connects at 1 in *Dia. 14*, a ko follows after Black 2. Black is left with the seven-stone capture of 'a', so this ko is nothing to boast about. It's only too apparent that attempting to force with 80 was wrong.

Correct is answering Black 79 by blocking at 91. That way it rather looks as if White stays ahead.

My fretfulness from having slipped up in the bottom right corner led me to play 80 and gave Kobayashi the 'game-deciding' move of 83. I thought that it was all over.

Figure 7 (192–212). *A hole opens up.*

Thinking it was over, my mind went numb. There was nothing else to do but to connect at 92 anyway and set the scene for resignation.

However, the move that Kobayashi played after a little time went by was Black 93. 'Could this be true?' I wondered. It was really strange. Perhaps my mental blank had spread to Kobayashi, opening up a hole in his thinking.

As you can see, Black 93 lets White jump to 94, so the liberties at A and B are not filled in as in *Dia. 14*. The result is still a ko, but there's a big difference: Black is not left with the capture at C.




Figure 7 (192–212)
103: ko; 105: connects

Thus the lead was reversed yet again. Victory dropped into my lap. It's not a very satisfying way of winning, but a win is a win. Now I can play in the Honinbo title next year too.

As I wrote at the beginning, I have the feeling that I've begun to get a little insight into go. A light, though very faint, has shone onto the game that was nothing but suffering for



Cho defended the Honinbo title, but needed a bit of luck in the final game. Kobayashi made a terrible blunder after upsetting Cho's lead. 'I knew the correct move, but for some reason my hand went to the wrong point,' he said. 'This is the first time I've done something like this.' Sharing a joke with Cho are Takagi 9-dan (left of Cho) and Kojima 9-dan (right of Cho).

me, illuminating the board that was pitch black.

For a while I've been on the receiving end, being besieged by challenges from Kobayashi. He's got two big ones himself, so it's about

time I went and challenged him. Wouldn't this be the best way of repaying my debt to him?

Black resigns after White 212.

(Kido, September 1991. Honinbo report translated by John Power.)

Shuko's Winter Training Camp

As recent photos show, Shuko is only a shadow of his former self physically, but mentally two things remain unchanged: his legendary skill and his enthusiasm for transmitting it to the younger generation.

For the past five years or so, Shuko has been holding regular summer and winter training camps for the young players who study under him. This winter a record 34 professionals participated in the camp held at Yugawara hot spring from December 24 to 27. Not all the players could claim to be members of the younger generation — Yoda Norimoto (age 26) and Komatsu Hideki (age 25) might just squeeze in, but what about Abe Yoshiteru 9-dan, who was born in 1941? Actually, Abe is proud to count himself an unofficial 'disciple' of Shuko's and in any case he'll go anywhere go is going to be studied. He was accompanied by his daughter Yumiko 1-dan (age 21).

As can be seen from these names, some well-known players participated in the training camp, though the majority are unknown low-dans. They were joined by two Chinese women who at present live in Japan: Rui Naiwei, the world's only woman 9-dan, and Zhang Xuan 7-dan.

The main event at the camp was an 8-round Swiss tournament (time allowance: 90 minutes per side). A special rule was that players under 5-dan played on black giving a komi of only 2 1/2 points when matched against high-dan opponents.

The winner of the tournament, with 7-1, was Komatsu, his only loss being to Rui. Second place was taken by a dark horse: Takao Shinji 1-dan, on 6-2. Readers may remember his name from our article 'The Gateway to a Professional Career' in GW63, in which Tozawa 9-dan predicted a bright future for him. Even allowing for the advantage of the small komi, the 15-year-old Takao performed very creditably by defeating in turn Abe 9-

dan, Mimura 6-dan, Yoda 8-dan, Imamura Toshiya 9-dan, and Ogata 8-dan. He then suffered losses to Komatsu 7-dan and Yuki Satoshi 7-dan, but picked up another win against Hikosaka Naoto 8-dan in the final round.

Third place went to Yuki, 4th to Yata Naoki 4-dan, and 5th to Cho Sonjin 6-dan.

Yoda suffered three losses to put him out of the running, but he did score an important win in the 6th round. When Rui Naiwei won the tournament in the summer camp last year, Yoda, as the leading member of the 'Shuko brigade', vowed that he would shave his head if he lost to her this time too. Yoda managed to redeem his honour. Both Rui and Zhang also finished with 5-3.

Below are two games from the tournament.




Figure 1 (1-50)

White: Komatsu 7-dan; Black: Rui 9-dan
komi: 5 1/2

Figure 1. The forcing move of 23 is useful later when Black plays 29 and 31. White can't aim at A after 33.

White 36 misses a chance: a probe at 46 would be tough for Black to answer.

White 46 is a bad move: it should be at 50. Black was sociable, however, answering with 47 and 49, missing his chance to attack at 50. Still, White's sin in helping Black to solidify his top right is the greater.




Figure 2 (51-121)

Figure 2. White attempts to harass the black group at the top with 56 on, but Rui gives him no chance to do anything. She scores a good win.

Moves after 122 omitted. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1-50)

White: Ogata 8-dan; Black: Takao 1-dan
Komi: 2 1/2

Figure 1. White played a dubious move in the joseki in the upper left corner. He would have had no problems if he had played 20 at

34. When he counterattacks with 20, Black forces with 21 to 27, then uses the strong move of 29 to look after his group. When he pulls out his stone with 35, he has the initiative in the fight.




Figure 2 (51-109)

Figure 2. White's two large groups are forced to flee across neutral (that is, worthless) ground to escape while Black solidifies his territory at the top, then swallows up two stones in the centre (66 and 70). This was a strong win for Takao.


Moves after 109 omitted. Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

Every day from 4 o'clock, after the two rounds had finished, Shuko held study sessions in which he reviewed some of the games. With a break for dinner, these sessions lasted until 9 o'clock. For the period of the camp, there was no TV, no newspapers, nothing but go for the participants. Shuko's credo is that 'there are no borders in go', and his camps are open to all. There were a number of Kansai Ki-in players present, such as Yuki, Moriyama 8-dan (who won all of his games on this year's tour of China), Yata and a couple of others. All of the participants attend Shuko's regular study sessions held in Tokyo, many of them traveling from Osaka or Nagoya, which shows how highly they are valued. Shuko is one of those unusual players determined to put as much back into the game as he got out of it.


(Based on a report in *Igo Club*, March 1992)

Find the Tesuji


Here are six tesuji problems. A dan player should be able to solve them almost immediately, but kyu players should also be able to find the answers with a little perseverance. Black to play in all problems.




1. Can you capture the two marked white stones?




2. Black can capture the three marked white stones.




3. Black can link up his stone in the corner.



4. Black can get up to mischief inside White's territory.



5. Black can live in the corner.




6. Find Black's best endgame sequence.


Answers on page 50.

Life and Death Problems


by Onda Yasuhiko 7-dan




1. White can get a ko.




2. White can get a ko.




3. White can kill Black.



4. Black can kill White.



5. Black can kill White.




6. Black can kill White.

Answers on page 52.


Find the Tesuji: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black pushes down at 1, then sets up a *geta* with 3. White can't escape.




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: caught

Dia. 2. White may think he can get away with 4 and 6, but he falls into a trap. Black gets a snapback.

Dia. 3. Attempting to set up a *geta* with 3 fails.



Dia. 3: wrong




Dia. 4: wrong


Dia. 4. Black 3 is the wrong knight's move.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. The first move, the cut at 1, is easy to find. The trick is spotting the tesuji of 3. Next —




Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: too good
6: connects

Dia. 2. If White 4, Black captures nearly everything with 5 and 7. He is one move ahead in the capturing race after 7.

Dia. 3. White must compromise with 4, letting Black capture just the three corner stones.



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: failure
6: connects


Dia. 4. Black 1 may look like a tesuji, but not in this position.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the move. Next —




Dia. 1: the answer




Dia. 2: success

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black plays 3 and 5. This is not a ko: Black wins the fight outright.

Dia. 3. White has no choice but to connect at 2, letting Black link up with 3.



Dia. 3: correct for both




Dia. 4: failure

Dia. 4. If Black 1, White gets a ko. This result might be bearable if Black had a lot more ko threats than White, but he doesn't need to fight a ko.


Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Black 1 is obviously the only move. The problem is to read out the continuation to the end. Black 9 is a double atari. Instead of 8 —


Dia. 2. If White switches to 1, Black captures the six white stones.




Dia. 1: success



Dia. 2: White captured



Dia. 3: success




Dia. 4: a seki

Dia. 3. Playing 6 in Dia. 1 at 1 here makes no difference.


Dia. 4. If Black starts out with 1, White is able to get a seki.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Black 1 runs contrary to one's normal instinct of trying to widen one's base. However, this is the only way to live. If White 2, Black lives with 3.



Dia. 1: alive




Dia. 2: alive


Dia. 2. The placement of White 2 is more troublesome, but now Black can widen his area with 3 and 5. White must play 6 to stop Black from living by descending at 8, but Black is able to get a seki. (Note that this is not necessarily better for White than Dia. 1, as his own territory is reduced.)

Dia. 3. If Black 1, White kills him with 2.

Dia. 4. Descending at 1 also fails.




Dia. 3: dead




Dia. 4: dead

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. Black 1 is natural. The point of this problem is the attachment at 3. Next —




Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: success

Dia. 2. White must backtrack with 4, letting Black link up with 5 and 7. This is a major endgame success for Black.

Dia. 3. If White answers the marked stone by blocking at 1, he ends in gote. If he omits 7, Black plays 'a'.




Dia. 3: bad for White




Dia. 4: worse

Dia. 4. Connecting at 1 is even worse. Black hanes at 2, not with the aim of linking up but of capturing White. The marked stone is seen to be on the vital point. Instead of 3 —

Dia. 5. White has to backtrack to 1, which reverts to Dia. 2.



Dia. 5: backtracking




Dia. 6: bad for Black

Dia. 6. As you can see, the unimaginative endgame moves of 3 to 7 lose a lot of points. Your antennae should always be alert for shapes with cutting points in them: there may well be a way to exploit the bad *aji*. In this case, the difference is six points in profit.

(From a supplement to Kido, March 1991)


Life and Death Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1




White plays 1 and 3, his aim being to lead Black into shortage of liberties. After 4, he gets an approach-move ko with 5. If White plays 3 at 'a', Black lives with 3.

Answer to Problem 2




White gets a ko with 1 to 5. (Black will use 4 to fight the ko, but 5 shows that even if he connects at 4, he cannot get an eye on the edge.)

Answer to Problem 3



Playing at 1 is a clever move. If Black 2, White connects at 3, and Black can't get a second eye because of shortage of liberties: if Black 'a', White 'b'.


Answer to Problem 4




Black uses the 1-3 combination to stop White from getting an eye in the corner. White can't get two eyes after 7. If White 6 at 7, Black connects at 6, making the six-stone *nakade* (large eye) shape.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. First Black narrows White's eye space by exchanging 1 for 2, then he sacrifices a stone with 3. After 4 —




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. The placement at 5 and throw-in at 7 stop White from getting a second eye.

Answer to Problem 6




Attacking from the inside with 1 is best. If White 2, Black has no trouble reducing White to one eye. If Black 1 at 4, White takes the vital point with 1, so Black will have to fight a ko with Black 5, White 3, Black 2.

(Go Weekly, October 1991)

Corner Problem

Black to play. Can he live in the corner?




Answer on page 64.


The Myriad Techniques of Go (2)

Sato Masaharu 9-dan


After looking at ladders in the first instalment of this series, the logical next step is to discuss the geta, a technique for catching the opponent in a net. Knowing the technique involved is usually a very useful hint, but even so you should find the problems below an interesting challenge.




1. Can Black capture the marked stone? The white group on the edge has only one eye, but it has a lot of liberties, so Black can't afford to get into a capturing race with it.




4. This shape is a little similar to Problem 3. The question is, of course, how can Black capture the marked stone.




2. Black's corner group only has one eye, so he has to capture something. Make sure you check all of White's possible counters.



5. Black can't make two eyes on the left side, so he has to capture White's centre stones. Black has strong moves at A and B: the question is how to use them in his *geta* strategy.



3. If you're an expert in joseki variations, you may recognize this shape. How does Black refute the over-aggressive move of White 1?



6. As you may have noticed, the problems are getting more difficult. How does Black make use of his two marked stones to set up a *geta*? Make sure you take White's possible counters into account.

Answers on page 58.

Efficiency (3)

by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan


The Peep

In our previous instalment we looked at forcing moves. In this issue I would like to dis-

cuss peeping moves and their merits and demerits.

In society at large peeping is frowned upon and at times it may even be a crime. The situa-


tion in go is more complicated. Sometimes it is reprehensible, sometimes it is a good move. It depends on the timing.




Dia. 1: a probe

Dia. 1. Peeping at a diagonal connection is a standard technique. Black 1 is a probe played to see how White reacts.

Dia. 2. If White connects at 1, Black will play 2 or 'a'. He has forced White to make a heavy shape, thus emphasizing his threat of attacking at 'b'. That move is so severe that White will probably have to defend at the top.



Dia. 2: making White heavy




Dia. 3: poor timing


Dia. 3. Playing the marked stone without first peeping is also a joseki, but in this case White will not necessarily reinforce at the top. If Black tries to punish him for the *tenuki*, White may obstinately *tenuki* again with a move around 2. Peeping now with 3 is badly timed: instead of connecting, White may push down with 4. Next —

Dia. 4. Let's assume the standard sequence to 7 follows. This result is very bad for Black. I hope you can see why. The invading stone at the top has been left in the lurch and the

marked stone on the right side has become almost useless — all because Black went wrong in his timing.




Dia. 4: a wasted stone




Dia. 5: changing the timing

Dia. 5. Starting out with the peep is therefore correct. If White counters with 2 to avoid answering submissively, Black can be satisfied with playing 3 to 7. This is an efficient result, because he has no stone at 'a'. If White later pushes down with 'b', Black 'c' is a good move. As you may know, the joseki move after 7 is White 'd'.

Dia. 6. Peeping at 1 in this position will not earn you any praise. Rather than forcing, this move is *aji-keshi*, that is, it eliminates possibilities. Instead of 2 —




Dia. 6: aji-keshi




Dia. 7: no gain

Dia. 7. White may counter with 2. If you believe that Black gains in the continuation to 7, then you need to change your way of thinking. The marked stone is wasted, and this is an inefficient way of surrounding territory.

Dia. 8. The standard strategy is to aim at the invasion of 1, an option that the peep at 'a' would lose. Black 1 needs the threat of linking up with Black 'b' to be viable.



Dia. 8: the proper strategy




Dia. 9: not appealing

Dia. 9. Timing is all-important when making a peep. Depending on whether you play it earlier or later, the whole development of the game will change. Here is an example from one of my games.


My opponent peeps immediately at 1. If Black 2, he plans to play 3. White 'a' next would be very severe, so Black has to do something, but he has no really satisfying move there. The ordinary extension to 4 would not appeal to a professional: Black's position on the side is too low. Therefore —

Dia. 10. I countered by pushing along at 1. Since the opponent is trying to make Black connect, refusing to do so is natural fighting spirit. Up to 7, Black takes control of the right

side and the centre. In this attempt to seize the initiative in the opening, Black is trying to turn White's peep against him. Perhaps because of distaste for this result —



Dia. 10: fighting spirit




Dia. 11: focus on the right

Dia. 11. My opponent (Rin Kaiho, in the 1971 Honinbo title match) reacted by switching to 2. Ignoring Black 1 is strange in the local context, but overall it's an excellent strategy. Black emphasizes the right side with 3 and 5. Black 5 at 'a' would also be an excellent move, and nowadays that is the move I would probably play. Black 9 injects strength into the right-side position, so the result seems reasonable.


As you can see, peeps lead to all kinds of unexpected results in actual play.

It's a rare game in which you don't see a peep made against a diagonal connection.



Dia. 12: timing

Dia. 12. This is another example from a game. Peeping at 1 before sliding at 3 is correct timing. White 1 is an effective way of making Black heavy; White 3 next is an important move. Playing White 1 at 'a', provoking Black 'b', would be worse than bad.




Dia. 13: neglecting to peep


Dia. 13. Simply sliding at 1 shows a lack of finesse. Black will launch a strong attack with 2 and 4, leading to complications. Peeping at 'a' will now be too late; instead of connecting at 'b', Black will push down with 'c' etc.

Dia. 14. Black has just reinforced his bottom position with the marked stone. I took the opportunity to peep at 1 (White was Awaji Shuzo, in a game played in 1988). This peep couldn't be better timed: it must have given Black a jolt. If you understand why, then you

have a professional feel for go. Deciding how to answer this probe is very difficult for White.




Dia. 14: perfect timing




Dia. 15: inefficient

Dia. 15. Connecting at 2 is the usual response to 1, but White will be left with the sequence to 7 later (he lives or gets a ko with Black 'a', White 'b'). This makes nonsense of the tight defensive move Black has played (the marked stone). In other words, the peep has turned the marked stone into an inefficient move.

Dia. 16. Having played so tightly with the marked stone, Black has to go all-out with 2. White will play 5, and leave this area for the time being. Since he can live on the side, Black will have to add a move at 8. Compare the gains made by both sides in the sequence to 9: White has reason to be satisfied. The marked black stone is yawning: it's a superfluous defensive move.



Dia. 16: a wasted move




Dia. 17: poor timing

Dia. 17. Let's assume Black expands his moyo with 1 instead of playing at 'a'. White can no longer peep at 2. He can pull off something in the corner after 5, but 3 and 5 work well for Black, forming ideal extensions along the bottom and the right side. This is the easy way for White to lose. Consequently, White will invade at 'b' instead of 2 and stake the game on being able to save his stone. Timing is everything with a peep.


Dia. 18. White 1 here is also an effective peep. It forces Black to connect at 2, thereby increasing the value of the right side; at this point White extends to 3. His play is very efficient. White can still do something in the corner with either 'a' or 'b' later. Note, of course, that I'm not claiming that this gives

White the lead.

Dia. 19. There is nothing wrong with simply extending to 1, but this will lead to a different game. If Black extends to 2, then you can't expect him to answer 3 by connecting. He will answer more aggressively, with either 4 or 'a'. In other words, when you play 1 first, you can't peep at 3 next.



Dia. 18: good timing



Dia. 19: wrong timing


Kyu players may have found the analysis in this issue of a high level, but I think it's important for you to be aware of the differences that a change in timing makes. Correct timing leads to efficiency and vice versa, and efficiency should be the concern of all go players.

(*Let's Go*, June 1988)


The Myriad Techniques of Go: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Pressing at 1 is the basic *geta* technique, but here the marked white stone gets in the way. When White connects with 2, it's clearly impossible to capture him. Playing an atari with 1 at 2 or 'a' doesn't work either.




Dia. 1: failure



Dia. 2: the tesuji


Dia. 2. Attacking from a distance with 1 is the answer.

Dia. 3. The key stone is the marked white stone, but there is no way for it to escape. If White 2, Black 3 makes *miai* of 'a' and 'b'. White is helpless.



Dia. 3: caught


Dia. 4. White 2 is a more dangerous move: Black has to play a second tesuji at 3 to refute it. Whatever happens, Black can capture the key white stone. Note that the timing is very important — if Black plays 5 before 3, White will escape.




Dia. 4: follow-up tesuji

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 is probably the first move to occur to most people. If White 2, Black captures with 3 and 5, so it seems OK, but actually Black is deluding himself.




Dia. 1: over-optimistic




Dia. 2: White's refutation

Dia. 2. White can link up to the right by jumping to 2. Neither the atari of 'a' nor the throw-in of 'b' accomplishes anything.

Dia. 3. Black 1 is an attempt to set up a large-scale *geta*, but Black has too few liberties for this to work.




Dia. 3: failure




Dia. 4: correct

Dia. 4. Black 1, the empty triangle, may be bad shape, but it is a strong move. After White 2, Black now makes the pressing move.

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black 2 and 4 lead White into shortage of liberties. White can't connect after 4 because Black has 'a'.



Dia. 5: short of liberties



Dia. 6: caught


Dia. 6. If White simply jumps to 1, Black ataris immediately. We can see that Black 1 in Dia. 4, letting White 'escape' for one move, was a very clever technique.

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. The position in the problem results from this joseki. The sequence to 15 is commonly seen. However, White 16 is a trick move.

Dia. 2. It is tempting to capture a stone with 1 and 3, but this is what White is hoping for. He forces with 4 and 6, then squeezes with 8 to 12, giving Black a terrible result.


Dia. 3. The correct answer is Black 1. This may not be an easy move to find, but it is the only way of refuting the trick move. Next —




Dia. 1: a trick move



Dia. 2: tricked




Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: a geta

Dia. 4. If White connects at 2, Black sets up a *geta* with 3 and 5.

Dia. 5. If instead White saves his other stone with 2, Black simply connects at 3. This wedge through the middle of White's position makes superb shape. The result is overwhelmingly advantageous for Black. He has convincingly refuted the trick move.



Dia. 5: very favourable




Dia. 6: wrong timing


Dia. 6. Playing 1 before 3 is a mistake in timing. This gives White the chance to capture the bottom stones with 6.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. A failed *geta* presents a miserable spectacle, so careful reading is called for before you play it. This would be an easy problem if Black 1 and 3 worked, but —




Dia. 1: a geta?




Dia. 2: a fiasco

Dia. 2. White has no trouble breaking out of the 'trap'. It's back to the drawing board for Black.

Dia. 3. How about pressing at 1? If 3 next, Black can't contain White, so —



Dia. 3: not quite




Dia. 4: correct


Dia. 4. Black must drop back at 3. If White 4, Black can capture him with 5, thanks to his strong shape to the left.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. The clamp of 1 looks vaguely like a tesuji, but what does Black do after White 2? There is no way to block both exits. Of course, if White obligingly plays 2 at 3, Black gets a ladder after Black 'a', White 'b', Black 2, but this is too much to expect.




Dia. 1: White escapes




Dia. 2: the vital point

Dia. 2. Black drops back to 1. White has various answers, but they all reveal this to be the vital point.

Dia. 3. White 2 is the easiest for Black. He cuts at 3, and 1 is waiting in the right place to complete the capture.



Dia. 3: easily caught




Dia. 4: a ladder

10: connects


Dia. 4. White 2 is a little trickier, but with correct play White still can't escape. This time Black sacrifices a stone to set up a ladder.

Dia. 5. If White 2, Black catches him short of liberties with 3 and 5.

Dia. 6. Connecting at 2 is White's last resort, but Black calmly answers at 3 and 5 and captures him. If instead White plays 2 at either 'a' or 'b', Black captures him with 3. There is no escape once Black has set up the large-scale *geta* of 1.




Dia. 5: caught again




Dia. 6: no escape

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. Because of the seeming weakness of the two black stones, one's first impulse may be to attack from 1. The idea is to set up a *geta* with 5. The continuation is long, but the moves are all forced. The result to 20 is a failure for Black. If instead Black tries for a different *geta* with 5 at 10, the cut of White 'a' is a good move that extricates White.




Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: likewise

Dia. 2. The next move that might occur to one is the knight's move of 1. White's answer is to force once with 2, then to move out with 4 and 6. He can't be stopped. If instead Black 1 at 'a', White counters with 'b'.

Dia. 3. Black 1 might look as if Black has given up on capturing White, but far from it. This is a superb move.




Dia. 3: the tesuji



Dia. 4: snapback

Dia. 4. If White tries to escape with 2, Black 3 and 5 set up a snapback: White 'a', Black 'b'. White 2 at 4 leads to the same result.

Dia. 5. If White 2, Black counters with 3; the continuation to 9 is forced, and this time Black gets an *oi-otoshi*.



Dia. 5: oi-otoshi

Continued on page 64.

1-dan Beats 9-dan



Kurotaki Masanori, born on 23 July 1975, becomes the first male shodan to beat a 9-dan in an even game. Actually, Kurotaki has some explaining to do: if he is so strong, why is he still a shodan after one and a half years as a pro?

The game presented below takes a place in go history as the first win by a male shodan over a 9-dan. It is the third such win overall: the previous two were by women. The trail-blazer was Ninomiya Hideko, who has since won promotion to 2-dan (not 3-dan, to correct a mistake we made on page 57, GW59) and married Komatsu Hideki 7-dan. Her win over Chino Tadahiko 9-dan in 1983 was given in GW35. The second player to perform the feat was Abe Yumiko, the daughter of Abe 9-dan, who defeated Ishii Mamoru 9-dan in a TV game (unfortunately, not an official game).

The third shodan win took place in the 2nd preliminary round of the 17th Meijin tournament. We would like to present it because it is an interesting game in its own right, but we don't claim it's an easy game to understand. It's one of those games that bring home to one the wideness of the gap between professional and amateur play (the way professionals don't try to save heavy groups, for example), but we think you will find it entertaining.

White: Kurotaki Masanori 1-dan

Black: Kano Masanori 9-dan

Played on 18 April 1991.





Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 1 (1-35)

Kurotaki: 'I had thought the sequence to 20 on the bottom right was a joseki, but I was astonished to hear later that 14 at 16 is the correct timing. Apparently White would have got a bad result if Black had used 17 to follow *Dia. 1*.

'Kano Sensei went wrong with 21. Black A-White B is standard. Black falls into a neat trap up to 34.'



Dia. 1

5: connects

Dia. 2

Figure 2 (36-70)

A fierce fight starts on the top right. Kurotaki: 'The first cause of the fight is Black 47. Something like jumping to 51 would be good enough. The hane of 56 is a bad blunder

by White: there's nothing wrong with answering at A.'

It's hard for an amateur to see why Black doesn't answer White 60 with Black 63. Kurotaki: 'White will block at 2 in *Dia. 2*. The sente sequence to 10 will probably be painful for Black.'




Figure 2 (36-70)

41: throws in; 42: takes; 44: connects




Figure 3 (71-100)

99: ko

Figure 3 (71-100)

The fighting continues at the top. Black seems to have the advantage.

Kurotaki: 'Playing White A before 94 is an important question of timing. Even so, White would still have a tough fight.'





Figure 4 (101-150)

Figure 4 (101-150)

Kurotaki: 'White 6 is a blunder. White should have made at cut at 1 in *Dia. 3*, then connected at 3. This way he could still make a reasonable game of it. If Black cuts at 4, White plays 5 to 9. White 10 in the figure is also slack. Fighting on by cutting at 20 was the only move.' The position looks tough for White when Black presses at 17.

Kurotaki: 'If Black had ignored the attempt to play a forcing move with 24, securing the capture of two white stones with Black 40, the game would have been hopeless for White.'



Dia. 3



Kano 9-dan




Figure 5 (151-208)
83: connects (at 74)

Figure 5 (151-208)

Kurotaki: 'I would have been in bad trouble if Black had used 57 to block at 1 in Dia. 4. Also, instead of 60, the *kosumi* of A is the only move.'

The upset comes after White 74. Kurotaki: 'Black 75 is a major blunder. I would have had

no hope if Black had just made the ordinary answer at Black 80. When White gets to peep at 76, Black doesn't seem to have any good answer.'


Living big up to 96 decides the game.

This win was Kurotaki's fifth in a row in the Meijin tournament. His winning streak was stopped by Haruyama, another 9-dan, who felt a lot of pressure in playing this tenacious shodan. He was heard to express the hope that Kurotaki wasted no more time in getting promoted.

Moves after 208 omitted. Black resigns.


(Go Weekly, 7 May 1991)

Note: Kurotaki finally won promotion to 2-dan on 27 September 1991.



Dia. 4

Continued from page 61




Dia. 6: a ladder

Dia. 6. White 2 and 4 look hard to handle, but Black calmly counters with 5 and 7. This time he gets a ladder. The slow-looking move of 1 actually sets up a wealth of tesujis.


(Igo Club, February 1991)

Answer to the Corner Problem

Continued from page 52.



Dia. 1: alive
5: takes



Dia. 2: dead

Dia. 1. Playing the first move at 3 is a mistake: White answers at 1, reducing Black to one large eye. Black 1 is the vital point. After 3, there is no way to reduce the corner to one eye.

Dia. 2. Black 1 looks clever, but White simply plays 2, reducing Black to one large eye. White is not going to help Black by playing 2 at 'a'.

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